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1 Introduction
This paper studies the relation between multi-period discrete-time and continuous-time
principal-agent models in the seminal paper of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987). For
certain intertemporal contracting problems, Holmstro¨m and Milgrom have argued that
optimal incentive schemes for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion controlling
a stationary technology must be linear. We propose to elucidate the structure under-
lying their linearity results by studying the relation between the discrete-time and the
continuous-time models in their paper. We provide an explicit construction establishing
the continuous-time model as a limit of discrete-time models with ever shorter periods
and establish a suitable continuity result for optimal incentive schemes in the transition
between the two. We also clarify the distinction between two kinds of linearity of optimal
incentive schemes and provide a discrete-time version of the economically more interesting
“linearity in profits” that Holmstro¨m and Milgrom establish only for the continuous-time
model.
Our work is motivated by two concerns. First, in the introduction of their paper,
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom argue that the nonlinearities or even discontinuities of optimal
incentive schemes that are typical for static principal-agent models are unlikely to be
robust to changes in these models that provide the agent with more scope to manipu-
late information. However, much of their actual analysis does not involve this notion of
manipulation at all. Manipulation of information plays no role in either their discrete-
time models or their continuous-time model in which the principal observes the entire
realization of the outcome process and yet a linearity result is obtained. Manipulation
of information does play a role in a version of the continuous-time model, in which the
principal is restricted to observing a linear aggregate of the outcome process, where a
stronger linearity result is obtained. However, this result has no immediate counterpart
in the discrete-time models.
Our second concern relates to the distinction between different kinds of linearity.
Most of the linearity results of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom refer to counting variables indi-
cating the frequencies of different kinds of outcomes rather than to economic variables such
as revenues, costs or profits. To understand the difference, consider their discrete-time
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models. In the static, i.e. one-period model, the agent chooses a vector of probabilities
over a finite set of possible states of the world. The payment the agent receives depends
on the outcome, i.e., the realization of the state of the world, according to the incentive
scheme that has been agreed on. The m-period model is an m-fold repetition of the static
model. In each period, the agent chooses a vector of probabilities over a finite set of
possible states of the world for that period; the associated effort cost is assumed to be
stationary. Under the assumption that the principal and the agent have constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA), a simple m-fold repetition of an optimal incentive scheme for the
one-period model is optimal for this m-period model. The overall payment the agent
receives then is the sum over the possible period outcomes of the associated one-period
incentive payments multiplied by the number of times the outcomes have been realized.
The overall incentive scheme is thus a linear function of the frequencies with which the
different possible outcomes are observed. The order in which the different outcomes arise
plays no role.
This linearity in accounts listing the frequencies of incidence of different outcomes
does not in general provide for linearity in outcome variables such as overall revenues,
costs or profits. There is no fundamental reason why, say, in a 2-period model, two
profit realizations of one should be treated as being equivalent to one profit realization of
zero and one profit realization of two. The dependence of payments on outcomes in any
period reflects the action the principal wants to implement in that period and the agent’s
effort cost function, but may have little to do with the revenues, costs or profits that are
associated with the different outcomes.
The distinction between the two notions of linearity concerns the continuous-time
model as well. In the continuous-time analysis of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, the agent
controls the drift rate vector of a multi-dimensional Brownian-motion with an exoge-
nous diffusion process. The different dimensions of this process correspond to the differ-
ent states of the world in the static model. The process itself may be interpreted as a
continuous-time version of the process indicating the evolution of the vector of frequencies
of the different outcomes from period to period in the m-period model. As in the discrete-
time models, CARA utility functions and stationarity in the technology ensure that the
optimal incentive scheme can be represented as a linear function of the cumulative change
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in this continuous-time analogue of the frequency accounts of the static model. Again
though, this linearity in accounts has little to do with economic variables such as revenues,
costs and profits.
Within their continuous-time model, Holmstro¨m and Milgrom obtain the linearity
with respect to outcome variables that they are really after by imposing the additional
assumption that the principal observes only the time path of a linear aggregate of the
different “accounts”, i.e., of the different dimensions of the Brownian motion whose drift
rate vector the agent controls. The optimal incentive scheme is then linear in the final
value of the aggregate.
However, this result has no immediate discrete-time analogue. To see this consider a
multi-period discrete-time model and suppose that the principal observes only the time
path of, say, total profits. By substracting total profits at time t − 1 from total profits
at time t, he can easily compute the increment in profits in period t. This increment
perfectly reveals the state of the world in this period. Hence, in the discrete-time model
the principal is always able to recover the information about the different “accounts” from
observing the time path of the aggregate. Again we only get linearity in “accounts” - no
matter how short the time period is.
In the following we first develop a unified framework in which the continuous-time
Brownian-motion model is explicitly obtained as a limit of discrete-time models. To see
that this is a nontrivial matter, note that in a discrete-time model the process indicating
how many times each outcome has been observed up to time t is nondecreasing in t,
negative instances of observation being out of the question. For convergence of such
processes to Brownian motion, one must be comparing the accounts process to some
norm so that a negative change can be interpreted as a shortfall from the norm. The
question is where this norm comes from and how it is specified. Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
do not say anything about this. Nor do they say anything about the dependence of
outcome variables upon the periodization. We fill this gap, and as a by-product provide
a characterization of the class of Brownian-motion models that can be approximated in
our setting.
Secondly, we show that in our discrete-time approximations there does exist an
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analogue of the Holmstro¨m-Milgrom result providing for “linearity in profits” in the
continuous-time model when the principal observes only the time path of profits as a
linear aggregate of the different dimensions of the Brownian motion. For this purpose we
assume that in the discrete-time model, the principal does not observe the time path of
the outcome process at all. He only observes total profits at the end of the final period.
Moreover, by the time the principal observes the aggregate, the agent may have destroyed
some returns that had actually been realized. With these assumptions about asymmet-
ric information concerning outcomes, we prove that the linear incentive scheme that is
optimal in the continuous model is approximately optimal in the discrete-time models if
the period length is sufficiently short. The argument relies on the continuity of certain
features of the model in the transition between discrete and continuous time. Stationarity
of solutions to discrete-time models, which is central for Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, plays
no role because under the given information assumption such stationarity is not obtained.
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom also argue that the optimal incentive scheme is linear in
aggregates if the agent’s effort cost depends only on a linear aggregate of the drift rate
vector he controls, e.g. on expected total profits. However, in Hellwig and Schmidt (2001)
we show that in the discrete-time models and in any continuous-time model that can be
obtained as a limit of discrete-time models, this effort cost function is not compatible
with their assumption that the principal always wants to induce the agent to choose his
actions in the interior of the admissible set.
The next section develops the framework for the analysis by introducing one-period
and multi-period models and specifying the role of the “length of the period” as a pa-
rameter of these models. Section 3 considers a sequence of control paths in the discrete
models and shows that if this sequence converges to a well defined control path in the
continuous model, then the incentive schemes that implement the control paths in the
discrete models converge to an incentive scheme that implements the limit path in the
continuous model. Whereas this result takes the convergence behavior of control paths as
given, Section 4 shows that this convergence behaviour is actually obtained for suitable
subsequences of optimal control paths and incentive schemes. Section 5 considers the
optimality of incentive schemes that are linear in aggregate profits. In this section we
show that in a discrete-time model with many short periods, a linear incentive scheme is
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approximately optimal if the principal only observes cumulative total profits at the end,
possibly after some profits have been destroyed by the agent. Section 6 concludes with a
discussion of related literature and of the implications of different modeling alternatives
in specifying the “length of the period”. Appendix A gives the formal proofs of all results
in the text. Certain supplementary results are given in Appendix B.
2 A Discrete Multi-Period Model
We start with a static model involving one period. At the beginning of the period the
agent chooses an action which gives rise to a random profit p˜i ∈ {pi0, . . . , piN}, pi0 <
. . . < piN . Following Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) we assume that the agent chooses
the probability distribution p over possible profit levels pii ∈ IR directly at personal cost
c(p) ≥ 0. Thus, the agent’s action is p = (p0, . . . , pN) ∈ P where P is the N -dimensional
simplex. Throughout the paper we assume the following:
Assumption 1 The effort cost c(p) of an action p ∈ P is given by a function
c(·) on IRN+1 which is strictly convex and continuously differentiable on some
open set that contains P .
The agent is assumed to have a constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion r > 0.
Given an incentive scheme associating the payment si with the outcome pii, he chooses
action p ∈ P so as to maximize his expected utility
−
N∑
i=0
pie
−r(si−c(p)) . (1)
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral. His payoff from implementing an action
p by an incentive scheme s = {s0, . . . , sN} is given by:
N∑
i=0
pi(pii − si) . (2)
In the static model, the contracting problem is to choose an action p and an incentive
scheme (s0, . . . , sN) so as to maximize (2) subject to incentive compatibility and to the
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individual-rationality condition that the certainty equivalent of the contract to the agent
be nonnegative.1
An m-period model is simply an m-fold repetition of the one-period model. In this
model, the agent chooses a new action (p0, . . . , pN) ∈ P in each period. This action
determines outcome probabilities for that period. Overall outcomes in the m-period
model are simply sums of period outcomes, i.e., sums of realized incentive payments,
effort costs, and profits.
As we look at models with varying numbers of periods m, we want to adapt the
“length of one period” so as to keep the total length of the time interval considered
fixed. We normalize this time interval to one and suppose that in an m-period model, the
individual period has “length” ∆ = 1
m
. The “length of one period” is to be understood
as a parameter which enters the data of the static model in such a way that a model
with m periods of length 1
m
has in some sense a similar economic structure as a model
with one period of length one. As m goes to infinity, presumably such models converge
to a continuous-time model in which the agent adjusts his choices continuously. For the
purpose of approximating the Holmstro¨m-Milgrom Brownian motion model we want the
continuous-time model to be one where the agent’s choices concern the drift rate, but not
the covariance matrix of a Brownian motion process. In the Concluding Remarks at the
end of this paper, we discuss other continuous-time processes and other approximations
including some that allow for an endogenous covariance matrix and some that are not
diffusions.
The data of the static model consist of (i) the N + 1 profit levels pii associated with
the outcomes i = 0, 1, . . . , N , and (ii) the effort cost function c(·). We need to specify
how these data depend on ∆ = 1
m
. For this purpose, we assume that in a model with
period length ∆, the profit levels pi∆i and effort cost function c
∆(p∆) are given by:
pi∆i = pii∆
1
2 ∀ i ∈ {0, . . . , N} . (3)
and
c∆(p∆) ≡ ∆ · c
(
pˆ0 +
p∆0 − pˆ0
∆
1
2
, . . . , pˆN +
p∆N − pˆN
∆
1
2
)
. (4)
1We assume that the certainty equivalent of the agent’s utility if he does not work for the principal is
0. By Theorem 2 of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987), this is no more than a normalization.
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where pi0, . . . , piN and c(·) are given as data of the static model with period length one,
and pˆ ∈ P , pˆ 0 is some exogenously given reference “standard”. It will become clear in
Section 3 that this standard is closely related to the disturbance of the stochastic profit
process in the continuous-time limit of our model. Without loss of generality, we assume
that profits are normalized so that
N∑
i=0
pˆipi
∆
i =
N∑
i=0
pˆipii = 0 . (5)
for all ∆.2
To see the point of this specification, it is useful to introduce auxiliary variables
µ∆1 , . . . , µ
∆
N , such that for i = 1, 2, . . . , N
µ∆i = ki
p∆i − pˆi
∆
1
2
, (6)
with ki = pii − pi0, or equivalently,
p∆i (µ
∆) = pˆi + µ
∆
i
∆
1
2
ki
∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , N} , (7)
p∆0 (µ
∆) = 1−
N∑
i=1
p∆i = pˆ0 −
N∑
i=1
µ∆i
∆
1
2
ki
. (8)
From (7) and (8), we see that there is a one-to-one correspondence between probabil-
ity vectors p∆ and vectors µ∆ of the auxiliary variables, provided the latter satisfy the
inequalities
−kipˆi
∆
1
2
≤ µ∆i ≤
ki(1− pˆi)
∆
1
2
(9)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and
−1− pˆ0
∆
1
2
≤
N∑
i=1
µ∆i
ki
≤ pˆ0
∆
1
2
. (10)
We may therefore think of the agent choosing a vector µ∆ of auxiliary variables satisfying
(9) and (10), with associated probability vector p = p∆(µ∆) given by (7) and (8), rather
2To see that this is indeed a normalization, suppose that
∑N
i=0 pˆipii = pˆi 6= 0. Let p˜i = pii− pˆi. Now we
can define pi∆i = ∆pˆi + p˜ii∆
1
2 . It is easy to check that for any time path of actions chosen by the agent
expected total profits in the m-period model are given by equation (11) below plus the constant term pˆi.
Furthermore, this constant term has no effect on the disturbance process.
In Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987, p. 318) the dependence of pi∆i on ∆ is implicit in their appeal to
the central limit theorem. For a more systematic discussion of the role played by this dependence, see
the Concluding Remarks.
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than choosing p∆ as such. If his choice is formulated in these terms, then in a model with
period length ∆, the choice µ∆ entails expected profits equal to
N∑
i=0
p∆i pi
∆
i =
N∑
i=0
(p∆i − pˆi)(pii − pi0)∆
1
2 = ∆
N∑
i=0
(pii − pi0)p
∆
i − pˆi
∆
1
2
= ∆
N∑
i=1
µ∆i . (11)
and effort costs equal to
c∆(p∆) = ∆ · c
(
pˆ+
p∆(µ∆)− pˆ
∆
1
2
)
= ∆ · c
(
pˆ0 −
N∑
i=1
µ∆i
ki
, pˆ1 +
µ∆1
k1
, . . . , pˆN +
µ∆N
kN
)
≡ ∆ · cˆ(µ∆). (12)
Both the effort costs and the expected profits with a given vector µ∆ are thus simply
proportional to the “length” of the period. If the agent were to choose a constant vector
µ∆ = µ in each of the m periods having length ∆ = 1
m
, total expected profits would be∑N
i=1 µi and total effort cost would be cˆ(µ), both independent of m and ∆ =
1
m
. The
tradeoff between expected profits and effort costs is thus not affected by the choice of m
and ∆ = 1
m
. This is precisely the invariance property across multi-period models that
we need. More generally, if in the m-period model with period length ∆ = 1
m
, the agent
chooses µ∆,τ = (µ∆,τ1 , ..., µ
∆,τ
N ) in period τ = 1, ...,m, then expected gross profits are
equal to ∆
∑m
τ=1
∑N
i=1 µ
∆,τ
i , and effort costs are equal to ∆
∑m
τ=1 cˆ(µ
∆,τ ). In particular, if
µ∆,τ = µ regardless of τ and ∆, expected gross profits and effort costs are equal to
∑N
i=1 µi
and cˆ(µ), regardless of ∆.
However, the probability vector p∆(µ) that is associated with a given µ depends on
∆. Indeed as ∆ goes to zero, for any finite µ, p∆(µ) converges to the exogenously given
vector pˆ. Underlying this convergence is the following structure: As indicated by (9) and
(10), we can think of the agent’s actions in terms of departures from the reference vector
pˆ. Consider an action p∆ that shifts probability mass from some low-profit outcome to
some high-profit outcome as compared to the action pˆ. With profit levels proportional to
∆
1
2 this raises expected profits by an order of magnitude ∆
1
2 . However the agent’s cost of
this shift in probability mass is made to depend on ∆ in such a way that the agent will
keep the order of magnitude of such shifts ordinarily to ∆
1
2 . That is, if the isoquants of
the cost function c(·) exhibit nonzero curvature, then the deviation of the action p∆ that
is actually chosen from the zero-expected-profits action pˆ will be on the order of ∆
1
2 , and
expected profits per period will be on the order of ∆.
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In the m-period model with period length ∆, the principal’s problem is to choose a
time path of actions {µ∆,τ}τ=1,2,...,m and an incentive scheme so as to maximize
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=0
p∆i (µ
∆,τ )(pi∆i − s∆i ) = ∆
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=1
µ∆,τi −
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=0
p∆i (µ
∆,τ )s∆i (13)
subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality. This problem depends not
only on expected profits and effort costs but also on the variance and the other higher
moments of the distribution of profits, all of which depend on ∆. However, as will be
shown in the next section, when ∆ is small and the agent’s action is close to the standard
pˆ, these higher moments are close to being independent of µ, and the incentive payments
that are required to implement p∆(µ) admit a simple approximation.
3 Approximation of the Brownian Model
We will consider the continuous-time model as a limit of the discrete-time models when
∆ goes to 0. The following definitions will be useful. Let A˜∆,τi ∈ {0, 1} be a random
variable such that A˜∆,τi = 1⇔ p˜i∆,τ = pi∆i , i ∈ {0, . . . N}, ∆ ∈ { 1m}m=1,..., τ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Clearly, Prob(A˜∆,τi = 1) = p
∆,τ
i , and A˜
∆,τ
i = 1 implies A˜
∆,τ
j = 0 for all j 6= i. Thus, each
A˜∆,τi has a Bernoulli distribution, but A˜
∆,τ
i and A˜
∆,τ
j are not stochastically independent.
We consider the incentive payments s∆i , i = 0, 1, ..., N that the principal needs to
implement a given action p∆ of the agent if the period length is ∆. For now we assume
that the action p∆ belongs to the relative interior of the set of feasible actions in the
model with period length ∆. Under this assumption, the first-order conditions for the
agent’s maximization problem imply that an incentive scheme s∆ = (s∆0 , . . . , s
∆
N) which
implements p∆ with certainty equivalent 0 in the model with period length ∆ must satisfy:
s∆i = c
∆(p∆)− 1
r
ln
1− rc∆i + r N∑
j=0
p∆j c
∆
j
 , (14)
for i = 0, 1, ..., N, where, as usual, c∆i refers to the partial derivative of the effort cost
function c∆ with respect to p∆i , see Theorem 3 of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987). In
terms of the vector µ∆, with p∆ = p∆(µ∆), one can use (12) to rewrite s∆i as:
s∆i = ∆cˆ(µ
∆)− 1
r
ln
1− rcˆiki∆ 12 + r N∑
j=0
p∆j cˆjkj∆
1
2
 , (15)
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where cˆi =
ci−c0
ki
is the partial derivative of cˆ with respect to µ∆i , cˆ0 = 0, and use has been
made of the fact that by (4) c∆i = ∆
1
2 ci for all i.
3
Using a Taylor series expansion of the logarithmic term in (15), the incentive payment
s∆i is approximated by:
s∆i = ∆cˆ(µ
∆)+
cˆiki − N∑
j=0
p∆j (µ
∆)cˆjkj
∆ 12+ r
2
cˆiki − N∑
j=0
p∆j (µ
∆)cˆjkj
2∆+O (∆ 32) (16)
If the principal wants to implement the time path of actions {µ∆,τ}τ=1,...,m,4 the total
renumeration that has to be offered is given by5
s˜∆ = ∆
m∑
τ=1
cˆ(µ∆,τ ) +
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=0
cˆi(µ
∆,τ )
(
A˜∆,τi − p∆i (µ∆,τ )
)
ki∆
1
2
+
r
2
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=0
A˜∆,τi
cˆi(µ∆,τ )ki − N∑
j=0
pˆj cˆj(µ
∆,τ )kj
2∆+O(∆ 12 ) (17)
Equation (17) admits a simple interpretation:6 The first term reflects the total effort cost
of the agent from choosing {µ∆,τ}, τ = 1, . . . ,m. The second term gives the appropriate
incentives to the agent to actually choose this time path of actions. If outcome i is realized
in period τ , this raises the agent’s overall incentive payment by an amount cˆi(µ
∆,τ )ki∆
1
2 ,
reflecting the marginal cost of shifting probability mass towards outcome i. The expected
value of this payment, p∆i (µ
∆,τ )c∆i (µ
∆,τ )ki∆
1
2 , is subtracted again because in expected-
value terms the principal’s payments to the agent depend only on individual-rationality
considerations. Thus the second term in (17) is proportional to the difference between
the actual realization of this profit level and the expected realization given that the agent
chooses p∆i (µ
∆,τ ). The third term is the risk premium that has to be paid to the agent
3Clearly the convexity and differentiability assumption on c(·) imply that cˆ(·) is strictly convex and
continuously differentiable on the set of all vectors µ = (µ1, . . . , µN ) for which pˆ0 >
∑N
i=1 µi/ki and
pˆi > −µi/ki for i = 1, . . . , N .
4We restrict attention to deterministic time paths of actions that do not depend on the history of
profit realizations up to time τ . Holmstro¨m and Milgrom have shown that the agent will be induced
by the optimal contract to take a constant deterministic action in each period, so there is no need to
consider stochastic controls (that may be history dependent) explicitly at this stage. However, we deal
with such control paths in Section 5 and in Appendix B.
5Here we made use of the fact that
∑N
i=0 A˜
∆,τ
i = 1 for all τ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Furthermore, we substituted
p∆j (µ
∆,τ ) in the squared term by (7) and (8), used cˆ0 = 0, and rearranged by putting the appropriate
terms into O(∆
1
2 ).
6See also Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993, p. 337).
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to compensate him for the randomness of the second term. The last term reflects the
approximation we are using; it vanishes as ∆ goes to zero.
Given the way the per-period deviations X˜∆,τi = ki∆
1
2
(
A˜∆,τi − p∆i (µ∆,τ )
)
of realized
from expected profits depend on the length of the period, the cumulative deviations
X˜∆i (τ) = ki∆
1
2
τ∑
τ ′=1
[A˜∆,τ
′
i − p∆i (µ∆,τ
′
)] (18)
from period one to period τ are more convenient to work with. For i = 1, . . . , N , X˜∆i (τ)
can be thought of as the cumulative deviation (up to τ) of realized profits under outcome
i from the expected value of these profits under the given policy of the agent. X˜∆i (τ) will
be called the “stochastic process of cumulative deviations from the mean”. As we restrict
attention to deterministic time paths of actions {µ∆,τ}τ=1,...,m, the increments of X˜∆i (τ)
are stochastically independent.
To embed the discrete-time model in continuous time, we use a linear interpolation to
represent the process X˜∆i (τ) by a continuous-time process X
∆
i (t) such that for t ∈ [0, 1]:
X∆i (t) =
(
1− t
∆
+
[
t
∆
])
X˜∆i
([
t
∆
])
+
(
t
∆
−
[
t
∆
])
X˜∆i
([
t
∆
]
+ 1
)
(19)
where [ t
∆
] denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to t
∆
. Note that X∆i (t) is a
random function taking values in C = C[0, 1], the space of continuous functions on [0, 1].
For any deterministic time path of actions {µ∆,τ}τ=1,...,m in the discrete-time model we
also use a continuous-time representation µ∆(·) where
µ∆(t) = µ∆,[t/∆] . (20)
Theorem 1 Consider a sequence of discrete models with period length ∆,
∆ = 1, 1
2
, 1
3
, . . .. Suppose that, as ∆ → 0, the time path of actions µ∆(t)
converges uniformly to some continuous function µ(t), t ∈ [0, 1] such that
pˆ0 >
∑
i µi(t)/ki and pˆi > −µi(t)/ki for all t and i = 1, . . . , N . Then, as
∆→ 0,
(a) the stochastic process of cumulative deviations from the mean X∆(·) =
(X∆1 (·), . . . , X∆N (·)) converges in distribution to a process X(·) which is a
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driftless N-dimensional Brownian motion with starting point X(0) = 0
and covariance matrix Σ = (σij) where, for i = 1, ..., N, and j = 1, ..., N,
σij = k
2
i pˆiδij − kikj pˆipˆj (21)
with δij = 1 if i = j and δij = 0 if i 6= j.
(b) the total cost to the agent converges to
∫ 1
0 cˆ(µ(t))dt;
(c) the joint distributions of the incentive payment s˜∆ and the cumulative-
deviations process X∆(·) converges to the distribution of the pair (s˜, X(·)),
where X(·) is the driftless Brownian motion specified in (a) and, with
probability one,
s˜ =
∫ 1
0
cˆ(µ(t))dt+
∫ 1
0
cˆ′(µ(t))dX +
r
2
∫ 1
0
cˆ′(µ(t))Σ[cˆ′(µ(t))]Tdt (22)
where cˆ′(·) = (cˆ1(·), . . . , cˆN(·)).
Theorem 1 is closely related to the results of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) and
Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993). Equation (22) can be rewritten in the form
s˜ = s(Z(·), µ(·)) (23)
where Z(·) is the stochastic process satisfying
Z(t) =
∫ t
0
µ(t′)dt′ +X(t) (24)
for all t and, for any N -dimensional process Zˆ(·) of the form
dZˆ = µˆ dt+ dX, (25)
and any adapted process µ(·),
s(Zˆ(·), µ(·)) =
∫ 1
0
cˆ(µ(t))dt+
∫ 1
0
cˆ′(µ(t))dZˆ−
∫ 1
0
cˆ′(µ(t))µ(t)dt+
r
2
∫ 1
0
cˆ′(µ(t))Σ[cˆ′(µ(t))]Tdt.
(26)
In the continuous-time analysis of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom or Scha¨ttler and Sung, the
agent controls the drift rate process process µˆ(·) of the N -dimensional Brownian motion
Zˆ(·); the control process µˆ(·) must be adapted to the disturbance process X(·), which is
taken as given. The principal observes the realizations of the process Zˆ(·), but not the
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control process µˆ(·) or the disturbance process X(·). Under the additional assumption
that controls are restricted to a bounded set K, they show that an incentive scheme
implements a desired control process µ(·) with values in the interior of K if and only if
it takes the form s(Zˆ(·), µ(·)) given by (26).7 Theorem 1 shows that this implementation
condition on incentive schemes and policies in the Brownian model can be interpreted as
a limit of implementation conditions on incentive schemes and policies in approximating
discrete-time models.
In the continuous-time limit the agent controls only the drift rate while the higher
moments of the cumulative output process are fixed and fully determined by the fixed
vector pˆ. In contrast, he does control the entire distribution in the discrete-time models.
However, when ∆ is small, implementation of a given drift rate process involves actions
p∆(µ(·)) close to the constant action pˆ, the difference in any period being of order ∆ 12 .
Because of this convergence of the path of actions to the constant path with value pˆ, the
second moments of the cumulative-returns process in the limit are fully determined by pˆ,
and the higher moments vanish. The critical action vector pˆ thus determines the “noise”
of the agency problem in continuous time.
The vector pˆ also matters for the interpretation of the process Z(·), by which the
principal assesses the agent’s performance in the continuous-time model. Discrete-time
approximations of the process (24) are obtained by specifying
Z˜∆i (τ) = ki∆
1
2
[
τ∑
τ ′=1
A˜∆,τ
′
i − pˆiτ
]
(27)
as the cumulative contribution to total profits stemming from outcome i in excess of
some standard that is given by the probability pˆi. Using linear interpolation as be-
fore, one obtains continuous-time representations Z∆(·) of these discrete-time approxi-
mations. By a simple corollary to Theorem 1, the pairs (s˜∆, Z∆(·)) converge to the pair
(s(Z(·), µ(·)), Z(·)) that is given by (26) and (24). For any τ, by (3) and (5), the sum∑N
i=1 Z˜
∆
i (τ) is just equal to the sum
∑τ
τ ′=1 p˜i
∆,τ ′ of profits from period 1 to period τ .
Theorem 1 takes the discrete model as given and shows how to obtain a Brownian
model as the limit of a sequence of these discrete models. We could have proceeded the
7Theorem 6 of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom shows that (26) is necessary to implement µ(·). In a more
general model, Theorems 4.2 and Corollary 4.1 of Scha¨ttler and Sung show that if the effort cost function
cˆ(·) is convex, then (26) is sufficient as well as necessary to implement µ(·).
13
other way round, asking whether it is possible to approximate a given Brownian model
with some sequence of discrete models. The following result, which is an immediate
corollary to Theorem 1, gives an answer to this question.
Corollary 1 Let B be a given N-dimensional Brownian motion with zero drift
and covariance matrix Σ. Suppose that if the agent chooses a control process
µ(·), then the agent’s cumulative costs are given by the differential equation
dc = cˆ(µ(t))dt (28)
and the stochastic process X(·) of cumulative deviations of actual profits from
mean profits induced by µ(·) is B. If there exist real numbers k1, . . . , kN and
positive real numbers pˆ1, . . . , pˆN with
∑N
i=1 pˆi ≤ 1 such that Σ = (σij) can
be written as in (21), then to this continuous-time model there corresponds a
discrete-time model with period length ∆ in which
- there are N + 1 possible profit levels in each period which are given by
pi∆0 = −∆
1
2
N∑
i=1
pˆiki and pi
∆
i = ∆
1
2
(
ki −
N∑
i=1
pˆiki
)
(29)
- the probability p∆i (µ
∆) is given by (7) and (8), with µ∆,[t/∆] = µ([t/∆]),
- and the cost to the agent in each period is given by c∆(p∆(µ∆)) = ∆cˆ(µ∆),
such that the continuous model is the limit of this discrete model (in the sense
of Theorem 1) as ∆ approaches 0.
Corollary 1 requires that the covariance matrix Σ = (σij) of the N -dimensional
Brownian motion can be written as in (21). IfN = 1, this is always possible. IfN > 1, this
condition implies a restriction on the set of Brownian models that can be approximated
by a sequence of discrete models. This restriction stems from the fact that in the discrete
model only one state of the world can materialize in each period. This implies that the
accounts A˜∆,τi and thus also the accounts X˜
∆,τ
i have a special covariance structure. For
example, it is impossible that the X˜∆,τi are stochastically independent. Therefore this
restriction is very natural.
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In the entire analysis here, the dimension N of the Brownian motion has referred to
the number of different profit levels that can be distinguished. Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
(1987, p. 322) offer a second interpretation according to which N refers to different
activities of the agent. For example, if N = 2, account X1 could be a measure of revenues,
while X2 could be a measure of costs. Thus, µ1 reflects the agent’s effort to increase
revenues, while µ2 reflects his effort to reduce costs. With this interpretation the Brownian
model could have any variance-covariance structure. It is possible to show that any N -
dimensional Brownian motion model (with an arbitrary covariance matrix Σ) can be
approximated by a discrete model, if we extend the dimension of the discrete model to
2N − 1. However, we do not want to go into the details of this approximation here.8
4 The Convergence of Optimal Control Paths
and Incentive Schemes
So far, we have only been concerned with the behaviour of the agent. We now consider the
behaviour of the principal. Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987, Theorem 5) have shown that
in the repeated discrete-time model, the principal’s problem always has a solution in which
he induces the agent to take the same action in each period, regardless of prior history.
Form = 1, 2, ... and ∆ = 1
m
, let µ∆∗(·) be such a control path with constant value µ∆∗ that
is optimal for the principal in the discrete-time model with period length ∆ and consider
the behaviour of the sequence {µ∆∗(·)} as ∆ goes to zero. Our claim that the discrete-
time specifications considered in this paper provide “appropriate” approximations of the
continuous-time Brownian-motion model rests on the proposition that the solutions to the
principal’s problems in the discrete-time models are close to solutions to the principal’s
8To sketch the basic idea suppose that the Brownian model is two-dimensional and that µ1 is the drift
rate of revenues while µ2 is the drift rate of costs. To approximate this model by a sequence of discrete
models we need at least two different levels of revenues R ∈ {R1, R2} and two levels of costs C ∈ {C1, C2}.
Thus, in each period there are four different possible outcomes {(R1, C1), (R1, C2), (R2, C1), (R2, C2)},
which means that there are 22 − 1 = 3 different accounts. With this three-dimensional model we can
approximate any variance-covariance matrix in the two-dimensional continuous model by choosing the
correlation between the Bernoulli distributions over {R1, R2} and {C1, C2} appropriately. If we want
to allow for, say, Mr levels of revenues and Mc levels of costs, we need a model with Mr ·Mc possible
outcomes and hence Mr ·Mc − 1 different accounts. The problem of getting from these Mr ·Mc − 1
different accounts to incentive schemes that are defined in terms of just revenue and cost aggregates is
then the same as the problem of aggregation across accounts that is studied in Sections 5 and 6.
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problem in the continuous-time model if the length of the period is short and there are
many periods. This requires that the sequence {µ∆∗(·)} of optimal control paths in the
discrete-time models have a limit path µ∗(·) and that this limit path in turn be an optimal
control path in the continuous-time model.
Three issues arise: First, under what conditions does the sequence {µ∆∗(·)} have a
limit path µ∗(·) at all? Second, if it does have a limit path, can Theorem 1 - which is based
on first-order conditions for interior controls - be applied to µ∗(·) and the subsequence
{µ∆′∗(·)} of {µ∆∗(·)} that converges to µ∗(·)? Third, does µ∗(·) provide a solution to the
principal’s problem in the continuous-time model? We consider each issue in turn.
First, to ensure that the sequence {µ∆∗(·)} of constant optimal control paths in the
discrete-time models have a limit path µ∗(·), we assume that controls are restricted to a
compact set Kˆ ⊂ IRN . This guarantees that the sequence {µ∆∗} of values taken by the
paths µ∆∗(·) has a subsequence {µ∆′∗} that converges to a limit µ∗. The corresponding
subsequence {µ∆′∗(·)} of constant optimal control paths converges uniformly to the control
path µ∗(·) with constant value µ∗.
Second, Theorem 1 with its reliance on first-order conditions for interior choices
of actions by the agent can be applied to the sequence {µ∆′∗(·)} and its limit µ∗(·) if
these paths all take values in the interior of the feasible set Kˆ so that the first-order
necessary conditions presumed in Theorem 1 are in fact appropriate. Therefore we impose
an additional assumption which ensures that any controls which the principal wants to
implement in the continuous-time model or in the discrete-time models when ∆ is close
to zero must lie in the interior of the set Kˆ.9
We start from the idea that there is some minimum payoff level, which the principal
can guarantee himself when ∆ is small, and that any action in the boundary of the
feasible set provides the principal with a payoff strictly below this guaranteed minimum.
To specify the guaranteed minimum, we consider the price that the agent would be willing
to pay (which may be negative) if he could have the entire project to himself and choose
9Alternatively we could allow for control paths with values on the boundary of Kˆ. In Hellwig and
Schmidt (1998), the conclusions of Theorems 2 and 3 were obtained regardless of whether optimal control
paths take values in the interior or on the boundary of the feasible set, see also Hellwig and Schmidt
(2001). However, the formalism is rather more messy when boundary controls have to be considered.
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the time path of actions he likes best. Selling the project to the agent for a price q is
equivalent to imposing the incentive scheme
s˜∆ =
m∑
τ=1
p˜i∆,τ − q. (30)
This is acceptable to the agent if q is no greater than the certainty equivalent of the differ-
ence between the cumulative total profits
∑m
τ=1 p˜i
∆,τ and the effort cost
∑m
τ=1 c
∆(p∆,τ ) =
∆
∑m
τ=1 cˆ(µ
∆,τ ) under the time path of actions {µ∆,τ} that he chooses. If the agent is
free to choose µ∆,τ = 0 (or p∆,τ = pˆ) for τ = 1, . . . ,m, this is no less than the certainty
equivalent of the difference
∑m
τ=1 p˜i
∆,τ − cˆ(0) between the sum of returns and effort costs
at the constant action µ∆,τ = 0. Conditions (3) and (5) imply that as ∆ converges to zero,
the distribution of the sum of returns
∑m
τ=1 p˜i
∆,τ that is induced by the constant action
µ∆,τ = 0 for τ = 1, ...,m converges to a normal distribution with mean zero and vari-
ance σ2 :=
∑N
i=0 pˆipi
2
i , and the certainty equivalent of the difference
∑m
τ=1 p˜i
∆,τ− cˆ(0) to the
agent at the constant action µ∆,τ = 0 converges to − r
2
σ2− cˆ(0). If q < − r
2
σ2− cˆ(0), then
for ∆ sufficiently small, the incentive scheme (30) is acceptable to the agent and provides
the principal with the payoff q. This is also true in the continuous-time model because
− r
2
σ2− cˆ(0) is also the certainty equivalent for the agent of the difference∑Ni=1 Zi(1)− cˆ(0)
under the distribution induced by the constant action µ(t) ≡ 0.10 Thus we obtain:
Lemma 1 Assume that µ = 0 is a feasible action. Then for any η > 0 and
any sufficiently small ∆ > 0, in the discrete-time model with period length ∆
and in the continuous-time model, the principal can guarantee himself a payoff
no less than − r
2
σ2 − cˆ(0)− η.
Lemma 1 motivates the following assumption:
Assumption 2 In the discrete-time models and in the continuous-time model,
controls are constrained to lie in a compact convex set Kˆ ⊂ IRN . Moreover,
there exists a compact subset K of the interior of Kˆ such that 0 ∈ K and for
some η > 0,
N∑
i=1
µi − cˆ(µ) < −r
2
σ2 − cˆ(0)− η (31)
10By (24) and (5), (30) can also be written as s˜∆ =
∑N
i=1 Z˜
∆
i (m)−q, so the scheme s˜ =
∑N
i=1 Zi(1)−q
is just the continuous-time version of (30).
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whenever µ /∈ K.
Note that Assumption 2 concerns the values of the cost function not its derivatives.
It does not require any derivative to go out of bounds, e.g., near the boundary of the set
K. Unboundedness of derivatives would be incompatible with Assumption 1, which has
been used extensively in the proof of Theorem 1(c).
The left hand side of (31) would be the expected net profit of the principal of im-
plementing µ 6∈ K if he could do so without compensating the agent for bearing the risk
that is necessary to induce him to choose µ. The assumption states that this is strictly
less than and bounded away from the minimum payoff that, according to Lemma 1, the
principal can guarantee himself in the discrete-time model with a sufficiently small period
length ∆ and in the continuous-time model. For small ∆, it can therefore not be optimal
for the principal to induce the agent to choose controls outside of K.
Lemma 2 Impose Assumption 2 as well as Assumption 1. For ∆ = 1, 1
2
, ...
and m = 1
∆
, let µ∆∗ ∈ IRN be a control vector such that the control path
{µ∆∗(·)} with the constant value µ∆∗ solves the principal’s problem in the m-
period problem with period length ∆ when controls are restricted to lie in Kˆ.
Then µ∆∗ ∈ K for any sufficiently small ∆.
Because K is a subset of the interior of the feasible set Kˆ, this justifies the reliance
on first-order conditions for interior solutions in Theorem 1 and settles the second issue.
Let us now turn to the third and most difficult issue. As mentioned above, the
assumption that in the m-period problem with period length ∆, a control path with a
constant value µ∆∗ is optimal for the principal is without loss of generality, see Holmstro¨m
and Milgrom (1987, Theorem 5). With controls constrained to lie in the compact set Kˆ,
the sequence {µ∆∗} has a subsequence {µ∆′∗} which converges to a limit µ∗; by Lemma 2,
µ∗ actually belongs to K and, hence, to the interior of Kˆ. The corresponding subsequence
{µ∆′∗(·)} of constant optimal control paths converges to the path µ∗(·) with constant
value µ∗. We want to show that this control path is itself optimal for the principal in the
continuous-time model.
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Technically, we need a continuity property of maximizers in the transition from
discrete-time to continuous-time models. This requires an application of the maximum
theorem of Berge (1959), by which a limit of a sequence of solutions to different maximiza-
tion problems is itself a solution to the maximization problem “in the limit” provided the
maximization problems along the sequence are sufficiently “similar” to the maximization
problem “in the limit”. The question is whether the principal’s maximization problems
in the multi-period discrete-time models are in fact “similar” - in the sense required for
the application of Berge’s theorem - to his problem in the continuous-time model.
Theorem 1 - in combination with the results of Scha¨ttler and Sung - provides one part
of the answer to this question: If a subsequence {µ∆′∗(·)} of optimal control paths with
constant values µ∆
′∗ in the discrete-time models converges to a control path µ∗(·), then
the path µ∗(·), with constant value µ∗ = limµ∆′∗, is implementable in the continuous-time
model. Moreover, the incentive payments s˜∆
′
that are associated with the implementation
of the paths µ∆
′∗(·) in the discrete-time models converge in distribution to the incentive
payment s˜ that is associated with the implementation of the path µ∗(·) in the continuous-
time model. The expected cost to the principal of implementing µ∗(·) in the continuous-
time model is not significantly different from the expected cost of implementing µ∆
′∗(·)
in the discrete-time model with period length ∆′ when ∆′ is close to zero. This ensures
that the principal’s maximum payoff in the continuous-time model is no worse than the
limit of the maximum payoffs in the discrete-time models.
To infer that µ∗(·) is in fact optimal for the principal in the continuous-time model,
we must also show that his maximum payoff in this model is no better than the limit of the
maximum payoffs in the discrete-time models. For this purpose we want to argue that in
any discrete-time model with short periods the principal is able to implement - at similar
costs - a control path which is close to an optimal path for the continuous-time model.
In contrast to the analysis so far, which has exclusively focused on first-order necessary
conditions for implementation, this requires some account of sufficient conditions for the
implementation of control paths in the discrete-time models.
The importance of the distinction between first-order necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the implementation of an action by an incentive scheme is well known from
the work of Mirrlees (1999) or Grossman and Hart (1983). There does not seem to be
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any direct approach to obtaining sufficient conditions in the multi-period discrete-time
models. However we can use an indirect approach: For the continuous-time model, the
convexity assumptions on the effort cost function and on the feasible set imply that the
first-order necessary conditions for implementation of a stipulated control path by an in-
centive scheme are also sufficient, see Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993, Theorem 4.2). Indeed
our assumption of strict convexity of the effort cost function ensures that when the agent
is faced with a given incentive scheme in the continuous-time model, his choice of control
path is unique. By continuity considerations (another application of Berge’s maximum
theorem, this time to the agent), it follows that, in a discrete-time model with short pe-
riods, any control path that the agent is willing to choose when faced with an incentive
scheme close to the scheme that implements an optimal control path in the continuous-
time model must itself be close to the optimal control path in the continuous-time model.
This ensures that the principal’s maximum payoff in the continuous-time model cannot
be strictly better than the limit of his maximum payoffs in the discrete-time models.
This result is stated formally in the following theorem which proves our claim that
our discrete-time models approximate the Brownian-motion model of Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom.
Theorem 2 Impose Assumption 2 as well as Assumption 1. For ∆ = 1, 1
2
, ...
and m = 1
∆
, let µ∆∗ ∈ IRN be a control vector such that the control path
{µ∆∗(·)} with the constant value µ∆∗ solves the principal’s problem in the m-
period problem with period length ∆ when controls are restricted to lie in Kˆ.
If µ∗ is any limit point of the sequence {µ∆∗}, then µ∗ ∈ K. Moreover the
control path µ∗(·) with the constant value µ∗ solves the principal’s problem in
the continuous-time model when controls are restricted to Kˆ; in terms of the
control process µ∗(·) the optimal incentive scheme s∗ has the representation
s∗(·) = cˆ(µ∗) +
N∑
i=1
cˆi(µ
∗)Xi(1) +
r
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
cˆiσij cˆj, (32)
with (σij) given by (21).
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of optimal incentive schemes. The
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schemes
s˜∆∗ =
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=0
A˜∆,τi s
∆∗
i , (33)
which implement the optimal control paths µ∆∗(·) in the discrete-time models, can be
rewritten in the linear form:
s˜∆∗ = α∆0 +
N∑
i=1
α∆i Z
∆
i (1) , (34)
where, for i = 1, . . . , N , α∆i = [s
∆∗
i − s∆∗0 ]/ki∆
1
2 , α∆0 = s
∆∗
0 −
∑N
i=1 α
∆
i µ
∆∗, and Z∆i (·)
is the continuous-time representation of the process Z˜∆i (·) defined in (27). Under the
assumptions of Theorem 2 one easily sees that for any subsequence {µ∆′∗} of {µ∆∗} that
converges to a limit µ∗, the corresponding subsequence of coefficients {α∆′0 , α∆′1 , . . . , α∆′n }
in (34) converges to a limit (α0, α1, . . . , αN) such that αi = cˆi(µ
∗) for i = 1, . . . , N , and
the incentive scheme
s(Z(·)) = α0 +
N∑
i=1
αiZi(1) = α0 +
N∑
i=1
cˆi(µ
∗)Zi(1) (35)
implements the control path µ∗(·) with constant value µ∗ in the continuous model. More-
over, (35) and (32) are equivalent in the sense that s∗ = s(Z(·)) if Z(·) is the stochastic
process satisfying Z(t) ≡ µ · t+X(t).11
5 Linearity in Aggregate Profits
So far the optimal incentive schemes in the discrete multi-period and in the corresponding
Brownian model are linear only in accounts, not in total gross profits. For total incentive
payments in (35) to be representable as a linear function of the principal’s cumulative
total gross profits
∑N
i=1 Zi(1), we should require that
cˆ1(µ
∗) = . . . = cˆN(µ∗). (36)
As Holmstro¨m and Milgrom point out, (36) is trivially true if N = 1 and the static model
involves only two possible outcomes (“success” and “failure”). In this case, the principal’s
11In terms of the processes X∆(·) and X(·) that are defined in (18) and (19) and Theorem 1, (34) and
(35) become s˜∆ = αˆ∆0 +
∑N
i=1 α
∆
i X
∆
i (1), and s˜ = αˆ0 +
∑N
i=1 αiXi(1), where, for i = 1, . . . , N , α
∆
i and
αi are the same as before and αˆ∆0 = α
∆
0 +
∑N
i=1 α
∆
i µ
∆∗
i , αˆ0 = α0 +
∑N
i=1 αiµ
∗
i .
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cumulative total gross profit is just Z1(1), and (35) itself represents s˜ as a linear function
of Z1(1). However, this case is very special.
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom also observe that for N > 1 (36) is again trivially true if
the effort cost function takes the form cˆ(µ) = g (E(µ)), where E(µ) :=
∑N
i=1 µi. In this
case (35) yields
s˜ = α0 + g
′
(
N∑
i=1
µi
)
N∑
i=1
Zi(1) , (37)
so again, s˜ is represented as a linear function of the principal’s cumulative total gross
profits.
However, the specification cˆ(µ) = g (E(µ)) is inconsistent with our Assumptions 1
and 2 as well as Holmstro¨m and Milgrom’s assumption that in the static model the prin-
cipal wants to implement an action in the relative interior of the simplex P. In Hellwig
and Schmidt (2001) we show that in a discrete-time model with this effort cost specifi-
cation, the principal never wants to implement an action in the relative interior of the
feasible set.12 Any limit of a sequence of optimal control paths in the discrete-time models
must therefore lie on the boundary of the feasible set; the corresponding optimal incentive
scheme in the continuous-time model has a representation of the form
s˜ = α0 +
N∑
i=1
[
g′
(
N∑
i=1
µi
)
− di
]
Zi(1) (38)
where (d1, ..., dN) is a vector of shadow values to the agent of being constrained at the
boundary of the feasible set, and, typically di differs across dimensions. On the boundary
of the feasible set, incentive constraints are less demanding; there is no need to discourage
deviations that would lead out of the feasible set. This can be used by the principal to
reduce the agent’s salary risk without adverse incentive effects; the variables d1, ..., dN in
(38) serve this very purpose.13
In their most interesting approach to obtaining linearity of incentive schemes in total
12The intuition for this is fairly simple. For any given level of expected total profits, the overall surplus
increases if the riskiness of the agent’s salary is reduced. Starting from any path of actions in the interior
of the feasible set, in the discrete-time models, such a reduction of the agent’s salary risk can be obtained
by shifting probability mass in any period to the two outcomes with profit levels just adjacent to the
desired target for expected profits for that period.
13Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) assume that in the continuous-time model, the set of feasible actions
for the agent is open. For the given effort cost specification, this yields (37), but then the continuous-time
model has no discrete-time counterparts.
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profits, Holmstro¨m and Milgrom impose the additional assumption that the principal
cannot observe the time paths of the individual accounts Zi(t), i = 1, ..., N, contributing
to total profits, but only the time path of the aggregate z(t) =
∑N
i=1 Zi(t) and hence
of total profits. Given that in the continuous-time model, the disturbance terms are
independent of the agent’s actions, in this case, any change of the control process µ(·)
that leaves the drift rate process (
∑N
i=1 µi(·)) of the accounting aggregate z(·) unchanged
will remain undetected by the principal and will leave the distribution of payments to the
agent unchanged. Therefore the agent will always choose the control process µ(·) so as
to achieve a given target E(·) for the aggregate drift rate process (∑Ni=1 µi(·)) at minimal
cost to himself. At an interior solution, the first-order condition for this minimization
problem requires that the marginal costs of raising expected gross profits be the same
in all accounts, which is just condition (36). As shown in Theorem 8 of Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom (1987), the optimal incentive scheme in the continuous-time model must then
be linear in cumulative total profits.
We state this result formally. As before, let Kˆ ⊂ IRN be the set of admissible control
vectors. Let E,E be the minimum and the maximum of E(µ) on Kˆ. For any E ∈ [E,E],
let γ(E) be the minimum of cˆ(µ) for µ ∈ Kˆ satisfying E(µ) = E, and let µ(E) ∈ Kˆ be such
that cˆ(µ(E)) = γ(E) and E(µ(E)) = E. By standard arguments, γ(·) is a continuously
differentiable, strictly convex function on [E,E]. The derivative of γ(·) is denoted as γ′(·).
Proposition 1 Impose Assumption 2 as well as Assumption 1. Suppose also
that E∗ maximizes the expression
E − γ(E)− r
2
γ′(E)2σ2 (39)
over [E,E]. Then µ(E∗) ∈ K and, for all i, cˆi(µ(E∗)) = γ′(E∗) ≥ 0. More-
over, the control path µ∗∗(·) with the constant value µ∗∗(t) = µ(E∗) solves the
principal’s problem in the continuous-time model when controls are restricted
to Kˆ and the principal observes the aggregate process z(·) = ∑Ni=1 Zi(·), but
not its individual components. In terms of the cumulative profits process Z(·),
the optimal incentive scheme s∗∗ has the representation
s∗∗ = γ(E∗) + γ′(E∗)
(
N∑
i=1i
Zi(1)− E∗
)
+
r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2. (40)
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In the remainder of this section, we consider the relevance of this result for our
discrete-time approximations of the continuous-time model. We begin by noting that
there is no immediate discrete-time analogue. To see this, note that in any period τ ∈
{1, . . . ,m} the principal observes ∑ττ ′=1 pi∆,τ ′ . As the profit in period τ is simply pi∆,τ =∑τ
τ ′=1 pi
∆,τ ′ − ∑τ−1τ ′=1 pi∆,τ ′ , the principal can compute the individual accounts Z˜∆,τi even
if he observes the time path of total profits only. Since this information can be used
to improve the incentive scheme, the principal will use it as before. Thus we again get
linearity in accounts only. As this is true for any ∆ > 0, there seems to be a discontinuity
in the transition from discrete to continuous time.
Indeed, such a discontinuity may appear even if the principal observes only the final
profit aggregate z∆ =
∑N
i=1 Z
∆
i (1). For suppose that in the static model, there are three
different profit levels, pi ∈ {−1, 1
e
,+1}, where e is Euler’s number. For any ∆ then, the
decimal expansion of the aggregate z∆ reveals how often the profit level 1
e
∆
1
2 has been
realized; this in turn makes it possible to infer how often the profit levels −∆ 12 and +∆ 12
have been realized, so again the principal can infer the quantities Z∆i (1) that he needs to
know in order to implement the scheme (35).
To avoid such discontinuities in the transition from discrete to continuous time, we
need to impose a stronger form of information asymmetry. Going beyond Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom, we assume that the principal does not observe the time path of profits and,
moreover, that the agent is able destroy profits before he reports them to the principal.
The principal observes only the undestroyed profit zˆ ≤ ∑Ni=0 Z∆i (1) at date 1. He might
ask the agent to report not only undestroyed total profits but also the time path of
profits.14 Even more generally, he could ask for a message w from some general message
space and make the payment S∆(w, zˆ) depend on this message as well as the level zˆ of
undestroyed total profits. However, the revelation principle implies that there is nothing
to be gained by such a procedure. This is the point of the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that in the discrete-time model with period length
∆ the principal can implement a (possibly stochastic or history dependent)
14Like Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) we rule out the possibility that the principal requires the agent
to continuously report profits at any points in time t ∈ [0, 1]. The idea is that the principal cannot
monitor the agent continuously but only at exogenously given discrete points in time.
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control path µ∆(·) with an incentive scheme S∆(·, ·), which makes the payment
to the agent, S∆(w, zˆ), depend on some message w as well as undestroyed total
profits zˆ. Then there exists a nondecreasing incentive scheme s∆(·) such that,
when faced with the scheme s∆(·), the agent is willing to choose the control
path µ∆(·) and truthfully report total profits as zˆ = ∑Ni=0 Z∆i (1). The resulting
payoff for the agent is the same and for the principal is no less than under the
implementation of µ∆(·) through the scheme S∆(·, ·).
Proposition 2 shows that, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to in-
centive schemes that depend only on reported total profits. Moreover we may suppose
that these incentive schemes are nondecreasing, inducing the agent to report total profits
truthfully as zˆ =
∑N
i=0 Z
∆
i (1), without any destruction. These are in fact the only ad-
ditional restrictions that the information asymmetry introduces. If an incentive scheme
implements a control path µ∆(·) under the information assumptions of Section 2 and if
this incentive scheme can be represented by a nondecreasing function of cumulative total
profits, then it also implements µ∆(·) under the information assumptions in this section.
To see this, note that the incentive scheme is feasible for the principal because it depends
only on total profits. Moreover, as the incentive scheme is nondecreasing, the agent is
willing to report total profits truthfully. Finally, when the agent chooses the control path
µ(·), he faces exactly the same incentives under the information assumptions of Section 2
and of this section.
The assumption that the agent can destroy profits unnoticed and, therefore, that the
incentive scheme must be monotonic has strong implications. For example, any nonlinear
incentive scheme that is stationary violates monotonicity if the number of periods is
sufficiently large.15 For the model of Section 2, Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987, Theorem
5) have shown that the optimal incentive scheme is stationary. However, in the model
15A simple example illustrates this point. Suppose that there are three different profit levels, pi0 < pi1 <
pi2, and three corresponding incentive payments, s0 < s1 < s2, in the one period model, and normalize
pi0 = s0 = 0. Suppose the incentive scheme is not linear, i.e. s1pi1 6= s2−s1pi2−pi1 . Consider the case where
s1
pi1
< s2−s1pi2−pi1 . Then there exist numbers m1,m2 ∈ IN such that m1pi1 > m2pi2 and m1s1 < m2s2. If the
number of periods, m, satisfies m > max{m1,m2} and if the incentive scheme is stationary, monotonicity
is violated. To see this consider two time paths of profit realizations: In path A there are m1 realizations
of pi1 and m−m1 realizations of pi0. In path B there are m2 realizations of pi2 and m−m2 realizations
of pi0. Hence, total profit after path A is larger than after path B, but the agent’s total renumeration is
smaller.
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considered in this section, where the agent’s renumeration has to be a nondecreasing
function of total profits, the optimal incentive scheme need not be stationary. A nonlinear
incentive scheme might enable the principal to neutralize at least some of the effects of
having to condition on total profits rather than on each outcome separately.
Nevertheless, if the incentive scheme has to be nondecreasing, the scope for doing
so is limited when there are many short periods. To see where monotonicity makes a
difference, go back to the example with profit levels pi ∈ {−1, 1
e
, 1} in the static model,
and suppose that, in any discrete-time model with period length ∆, the principal would
like to penalize outcomes pi∆ = 1
e
∆
1
2 and to reward outcomes pi∆ = ∆
1
2 in any period.
Without the monotonicity assumption the corresponding incentive schemes as a function
of cumulative total profits would fluctuate ever more wildly as ∆ becomes small; such a
sequence of incentive schemes has no convergent subsequence. In contrast, if the agent
can destroy output unnoticed, it is impossible to penalize, e.g., an outcome involving ten
realizations of pi∆ = 1
e
∆
1
2 as opposed to an outcome involving six realizations of pi∆ = ∆
1
2
and four realizations of pi∆ = −∆ 12 . Indeed, as shown in the following result, monotonicity
automatically implies the existence of a convergent subsequence. It is this property that
is crucial to establish Theorem 3 below.
Proposition 3 Suppose that in the discrete-time model with period length ∆,
the principal can implement a control process µ∆(·) with a nondecreasing incen-
tive scheme s∆(·). Suppose also that the means of the resulting final payments
s∆(
∑N
i=0 Z
∆
i (1)) are uniformly bounded. Then there exists a nondecreasing,
upper semi-continuous function s(·) such that, for some subsequence {s∆′(·)}
of the sequence {s∆(·)},
lim
∆¯→0
sup
∆′≤∆¯
s∆
′
(z) ≤ s(z) for all z, (41)
and
lim
∆′→0
s∆
′
(z) = s(z) for all z at which s(·) is continuous. (42)
Given a convergent subsequence of incentive schemes, another application of Berge’s
maximum theorem shows that as the length of the period goes to zero, the control pro-
cesses chosen by the agent converge to the control process which he chooses when he is
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faced with the limit scheme in the continuous-time model. The argument is much more
complex than in Section 4 because for nonlinear incentive schemes, the solutions to the
agent’s optimization problems will typically involve nonstationary, time-dependent and
history-dependent controls. Even so, the maximum theorem can be applied, and we can
infer that the restriction to nondecreasing incentive schemes eliminates certain disconti-
nuities in the transition from discrete to continuous time.
Convergence of control processes is discussed in terms of cumulative controls. Instead
of processes µ∆(·), µ(·), which refer to the time paths of actions taken by the agent, we
look at the associated cumulative processes M∆(·) and M(·) where, for any t ∈ [0, 1]
M∆(t) =
∫ t
0
µ∆(t′)dt′ and M(t) =
∫ t
0
µ(t′)dt′. (43)
We think of the processesM∆(·) andM(·) as random functions taking values in the space
CN where C is again the space of continuous real-valued functions on [0, 1].
Proposition 4 Impose Assumption 2 as well as Assumption 1. Suppose that
in the discrete-time model with period length ∆, the principal can implement a
control process µ∆(·) with a nondecreasing incentive scheme s∆(·). Suppose
also that the processes µ∆(·) take values in the interior of the set Kˆ and
that there exists a nondecreasing, upper semi-continuous function s(·) such
that (41) and (42) are satisfied for some subsequence {s∆′(·)} of the sequence
{s∆(·)}. Then there exists a control process µ(·) in the continuous-time model
such that (i) the joint distributions of the cumulative control processes M∆
′
(·)
associated with µ∆
′
(·) and the processes X∆′(·) of cumulative deviations from
the mean converge to the joint distribution of the cumulative control process
M(·) associated with µ(·) and the driftless Brownian motion X(·) that is spec-
ified in Theorem 1, and (ii) the incentive scheme s(·) implements µ(·) in the
continuous-time model. Moreover, as ∆′ converges to zero, the expected incen-
tive payment Es∆
′
(
∑N
i=0 Z
∆
i (1)) of the principal to the agent under the control
process µ∆
′
(·) in the discrete-time model with period length ∆′ converges to
the expected incentive payment Es(
∑N
i=0 Zi(1))to the agent under the control
process µ(·) in the continuous-time model.
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Propositions 3 and 4 imply that whatever the principal can implement in a discrete-
time model with many short periods will not be very different from something he can
implement in the continuous-time model. Given that in the continuous-time model, a
linear incentive scheme is optimal, it follows that not much is to be gained from a nonlinear
incentive scheme, i.e., a suitably chosen linear incentive scheme is approximately optimal
in a discrete-time model when the number of periods is large and the length of each period
is small. The linear incentive schemes that we consider take the form
s∆∗∗(zˆ, η) = γ(E∗) + γ′(E∗) [zˆ − E∗] + r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2 + η (44)
where E∗ is the optimal value of the aggregate drift rate in Proposition 2 and η > 0 is a
sweetener that we introduce to avoid running afoul of the agent’s participation constraint
in the discrete-time model.
Theorem 3 Impose Assumption 2 as well as Assumption 1, and suppose that
controls are restricted to lie in the interior of Kˆ. If the principal is restricted to
using incentive schemes that can be represented as nondecreasing functions of
cumulative total gross profits, then for any ε > 0, there exist ∆ > 0 and η > 0
such that for any ∆ < ∆, the principal’s payoff from using the linear incentive
scheme s∆∗∗(·, η) that is given by (44) is no more than ε below his payoff from
the optimal incentive scheme in the discrete-time model with period length ∆.
Theorem 3 shows that the optimal incentive scheme in the continuous model (plus
an arbitrarily small constant η is ε-optimal in the discrete model if ∆ is sufficiently
small. It is our discrete-time counterpart to the optimality of linear incentive schemes
in continuous-time models that is established in Theorem 8 of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
(1987) or in Proposition 1 above. Like those results, Theorem 3 reflects the basic intuition
that nonlinear incentive schemes are vulnerable to manipulation. First, because profits
are aggregated over time and across accounts and because the agent can destroy profits
unnoticed, the principal has to use an incentive scheme that is a nondecreasing function of
total profits. As the number of periods increases, this severely restricts his ability to infer
the actual profit realizations by exploiting the discrete structure of the game. Second,
as the principal cannot distinguish between profits generated by different accounts, he
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cannot prevent the agent from spreading his effort across accounts so that the cost to
him of generating a given time path of expected profits is minimal; the equality (36) that
permits the aggregation across accounts in (35) is derived from this behaviour of the agent
rather than any structural property of the cost function. Because of these limitations on
implementability, the choice of an optimal incentive scheme is eventually driven by the
stationarity of preferences and technologies that push the principal to providing the agent
with stationary incentives that are independent of time and histories; as mentioned above,
a monotonic incentive scheme that provides for stationary incentives is necessarily linear.
Note that the principal’s inability to obtain the relevant information about indi-
vidual accounts stems not only from the fact that he observes only an aggregate across
accounts, but also from the aggregation over time that results from his observing only
cumulative totals at the end and from the agent’s ability to destroy profits unnoticed.
Aggregation over time also plays a role in the continuous-time analysis of Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom. When the principal is said to “observe” the time path of a Brownian motion
Z(·) = (Z1(·), ..., ZN(·)) or z(·) = ∑Ni=1 Zi(·), he is not actually observing any incremental
changes that could be interpreted as “rates of growth” of cumulative profits at any given
instants. After all, with probability one, the sample paths of the processes Z(·) and z(·)
are almost nowhere differentiable, and the stochastic differential equation dz =
∑N
i=1 dZi
is meaningful only in terms of its integral version
z(t2)− z(t1) =
N∑
i=1
∫ t2
t1
dZi,
involving aggregation over time as well as across accounts.
As for the assumption that the agent can destroy profits unnoticed, we suspect that
this can be replaced by something else. This assumption restricts the principal to non-
decreasing incentive schemes, which in turn guarantees the existence of a convergent
subsequence of such schemes. It seems likely that other assumptions on the information
available to the principal can serve the same purpose.
This should also be true of the restriction to interior controls. In the present setting,
in contrast to Section 4, we have not been able to endogenize this condition, which we
use to ensure that as we vary the length of the period the agent’s payoffs are uniformly
integrable and there is no discontinuous change in expected payoffs. It should be possible
29
though to obtain the desired uniform integrability of payoffs in some other way.
6 Concluding Remarks
The unified framework developed in this paper makes it possible to directly compare the
discrete-time and the continuous-time models of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom and to explicitly
derive the latter as a limit of the former with ever shorter periods. For a variant of the
discrete-time model, in which the agent can shift profits over time and across accounts and
in which he may destroy profits unnoticed, we have shown that an incentive scheme that
is linear in total profits is approximately optimal if the length of the period is sufficiently
small. This result reflects the intuition that a linear incentive scheme is desirable because
it is robust against manipulation of information by the agent.
The Holmstro¨m-Milgrom paper has given rise to a large literature, but only a few
papers are concerned with the methodological and mathematical underpinnings of the
analysis. Most papers in the literature just appeal to their results to justify the use
of linear incentive schemes in applications; for an example see Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
(1991). Among the more method-oriented papers, Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993) develop a
general mathematical framework for the study of agency problems when the agent controls
the drift of a Brownian motion in continuous time; we heavily rely on their results, which
strengthen and greatly extend the continuous-time results of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
(1987). Sung (1995) further extends the analysis by allowing for moral hazard with
respect to risk choices, more precisely, choices concerning the diffusion parameters of a
Brownian motion. Sung (1997) develops the corresponding analysis for continuous-time
agency problems concerning jump processes. Bolton and Harris (1997) also consider
continuous-time problems concerning jump processes as well as diffusions. However they
are concerned with first-best rather than second-best problems, considering optimal risk
sharing and optimal actions without concern for incentive compatibility and showing that
for arbitrary preference specifications risk-sharing considerations will typically call for
nonlinear contracts in a first-best setting.
The above-mentioned papers all work directly in continuous time and do not dis-
cuss the relation between static or multi-period discrete-time and continuous-time agency
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models. Multi-period discrete-time agency models and their relation to continuous-time
models are studied by Scha¨ttler and Sung (1997) and by Mu¨ller (2000). Unlike Holmstro¨m
and Milgrom (1987) these papers consider multi-period models as m-fold repetitions of
a static model in which the agent’s effort choice determines the mean of a normally dis-
tributed random variable. Mu¨ller (2000) shows that, as in Mirrlees (1974), in a model of
this type, the principal’s problem typically does not have a solution because a first-best
allocation can be approximated (but not reached) by a sequence of incentive schemes using
penalties for low outcome realizations to discourage shirking, the incidence of penalties
becoming ever rarer and the penalties themselves becoming ever more severe as one goes
along the sequence.16 In Scha¨ttler and Sung (1997), existence of a solution to the prin-
cipal’s problem in discrete time is also a problem. To get around it the authors impose
a restriction on the class of incentive schemes they admit; with this restriction, they find
that conditions for implementing a given strategy of the agent are similar in an m-period
discrete-time and in a continuous-time Brownian-motion model. Neither paper asks how a
continuous-time Brownian-motion model would be approximated by discrete-time models
with finitely many possible outcomes in any one period or what is the relation between lin-
earity of incentive payments in “accounts” and linearity of incentive payments in outcome
aggregates, e.g. in profits.
Finally, we would like to point out that our procedure for linking discrete-time and
continuous-time models is not the only one to be considered. Different approaches to
what one means by the “length of the period” yield different approaches to the relation
between discrete-time and continuous-time models; for some of these the continuous-time
limits may have very different properties. In the analysis here, the length of the period
was introduced through a particular parameterization of the agent’s effort cost function
c∆(·) and of the profit levels pi∆i associated with different outcomes. As an alternative to
the approach considered here, Hellwig (2001) considers the effort cost specification
c∆(p) = ∆c¯
(
E(p)
∆
,
V (p)
∆
)
, (45)
where E(p) is the mean and V (p) is the variance of profits in the given period under
the action p. He also considers a profit level specification pi∆i = pii, regardless of ∆, in
16In Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987), this difficulty was avoided by the assumption that the set of
states of the world in the static model is finite.
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addition to the specification (3), pi∆i = pii∆
1
2 that was considered here. The effort cost
specification (45) is a generalization of the specification considered in Section 5. The
difficulties considered there are avoided if limV→0 c¯(E, V ) = ∞. With this assumption
the discrete-time models have well-defined continuous-time limits. However, depending
on the specification of profit levels at different outcomes, the qualitative properties of the
continuous-time limits are quite different: If pi∆i = pii, regardless of ∆, the continuous-
time limit of optimal outcome processes in the discrete-time models is a jump process; in
this case optimal incentive schemes are bounded away from being linear. If pi∆i = pii∆
1
2 ,
the continuous-time limit is a Brownian motion with drift, this time with endogenous
diffusion parameters. In this case, optimal incentive schemes in the continuous-time limit
are linear and a version of Proposition 1 is true even without an additional restriction on
the principal’s information.
These results suggest that there may be several “canonical” continuous-time agency
models all of which embody the notion that the environment is stationary and the agent
takes frequent decisions, being all the time fully aware of the history up to the present. As
one would expect from the theory of infinitely divisible processes, continuous-time spec-
ifications involving jump processes can be approximated just as specifications involving
Brownian motion, but whenever a specification like pi∆i = pii∆
1
2 is available to guar-
antee that sample paths in the continuous-time limit are almost surely continuous, the
continuous-time specification will involve Brownian motion. Among such specifications
the one considered by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom stands out for the exogeneity of the diffu-
sion parameters. The effort cost parametrization (4) provides the basis for approximating
just this class of models.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1: Part (a) is a special case of Proposition B.1 in Appendix B. To prove
(b), suppose that the agent takes the time path of actions µ∆,τ , τ = 1, . . . ,m, where µ∆(t)
converges to µ(t) uniformly in t as ∆ goes to zero. Since µ(t) is continuous, there exists
a compact set K ⊂ IRN such that for any sufficiently small ∆ one has µ∆(t) ∈ K for all
t. Since cˆ(·) is continuous - and hence bounded on K - we find for the agent’s cost in the
limit as ∆ goes to 0:
lim
∆→0
m∑
τ=1
∆cˆ(µ∆,τ ) = lim
∆→0
∫ 1
∆
cˆ(µ∆(t))dt =
∫ 1
0
cˆ(µ(t))dt . (A.1)
As for (c), substituting X˜∆,τi in (17) yields:
m∑
τ=1
s˜∆,τ =
∆∑
τ=1
∆cˆ(µ∆,τ ) +
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=1
cˆi(µ
∆,τ )X˜∆,τi (A.2)
+
r
2
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=0
∆A˜∆,τi
cˆi(µ∆,τ )ki − N∑
j=1
pˆj cˆj(µ
∆,τ )kj
2 +O(∆ 12 )
From (b), the first term in (A.2) converges to
∫
cˆ(µ(t))dt as ∆ converges to zero. As for
the second term, the same argument as in (b) implies that for any sufficiently small ∆,
µ∆,τ belongs to a compact set K for all τ , and cˆi(µ
∆,τ ) is bounded, uniformly in τ . From
part (a) therefore, one finds that for any sufficiently small ∆′, the pairs(
X∆(·),
N∑
i=0
m∑
τ=1
cˆi(µ
∆′,[τ∆/∆′])X˜∆,τi
)
=
(
X∆(·),
N∑
i=0
m∑
τ=1
cˆi(µ
∆′,τ )
[
X∆i (τ∆
′)−X∆i (τ∆′ −∆′)
])
(A.3)
converge in distribution to(
X(·),
N∑
i=0
m∑
τ=1
cˆi(µ
∆′,τ ) [Xi(τ∆
′)−Xi(τ∆′ −∆′)]
)
=
(
X(·),
N∑
i=0
∫ 1
0
cˆi(µ
∆′(t))dXi(t)
)
,
(A.4)
as ∆ goes to zero, uniformly in ∆′. One also has lim∆′→0 cˆi(µ∆
′
(t)) = cˆi(µ(t)) uniformly
in t; hence
∑N
i=0
∫
cˆi(µ(t))dXi(t) converges in square mean to
∫
cˆi(µ
∆′(t))dXi(t) as ∆
′
converges to zero (see, e.g. Gikhman and Skorokhod (1972), p. 233). Therefore the joint
distributions of the processes X∆(·) and the sums ∑Ni=0∑τ cˆi(µ∆,τ )X∆,τi in the second
term of (A.2) converge to the joint distribution of the process X(·) and the stochastic
integral
∑N
i=0
∫
cˆi(µ(t))dXi(t) as ∆ goes to zero.
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Turning to the third term in (A.2), we rewrite this in the form
r
2
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=0
∆
(
A˜∆,τi − p∆i (µ∆,τ )
) cˆi(µ∆,τ )ki − N∑
j=1
pˆj cˆj(µ
∆,τ )kj
2
+
r
2
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=0
p∆i (µ
∆,τ )
cˆi(µ∆,τ )ki − N∑
j=1
pˆj cˆj(µ
∆,τ )kj
2 (A.5)
By the law of large numbers, the first of these terms converges to zero almost surely as
∆ goes to zero. The second term converges to the integral r
2
∫ 1
0 cˆ
′(µ(t))Σ[c′(µ(t))]Tdt,
a nonrandom constant. Thus, if the time paths of actions that the principal wants to
implement converge to µ(·), then the joint distributions of the processes X∆(·) and the
incentive payments s˜∆ converge to the joint distribution of the process X(·) and
s˜ =
∫ 1
0
cˆ(µ(t))dt+
∫ 1
0
cˆ′(µ(t))dX +
r
2
∫ 1
0
cˆ′(µ(t))Σ[c′(µ(t))]Tdt . (A.6)
Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 follows from the argument in the text and does not require any further
argument.
Proof of Lemma 2: For any ∆, let s∆∗ = (s∆∗0 , ..., s
∆∗
N ) be the incentive scheme implement-
ing µ∆∗ in the static model with period length ∆, and consider the expected payoff
UP∆(µ∆∗) =
1
∆
N∑
i=0
p∆i (µ
∆∗)[pi∆i − s∆∗i ] (A.7)
that the principal gets from implementing µ∆∗ in m = 1
∆
periods of length ∆. The agent’s
participation constraint implies
−
N∑
i=0
p∆i (µ
∆∗) e−r[s
∆∗
i −c∆(p∆(µ∆∗))] ≥ −1, (A.8)
hence, by the concavity of the CARA utility function,
N∑
i=0
p∆i (µ
∆∗) s∆∗i ≥ c∆(p∆(µ∆∗)). (A.9)
Upon combining (A.9) and (A.7) and using (12) and (13), one finds that the principal’s
expected payoff from implementing µ∆∗ in m = 1
∆
periods of length ∆ is bounded above
by
UP∆(µ∆∗) ≤
N∑
i=1
µ∆∗i − cˆ(µ∆∗). (A.10)
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By Lemma 1 and the optimality of µ∆∗ for the principal in the multi-period model with
period length ∆, it must also be the case that
−r
2
σ2 − cˆ(0)− η ≤ UP∆(µ∆∗) (A.11)
whenever ∆ is close to zero. Thus, by (A.10) and (A.11) and by the definition of K in
Assumption 2, µ∆∗ must belong to K whenever ∆ is close to zero. Q.E.D.
The proof of Theorem 2 relies on some properties of the continuous-time model under
Assumptions 1 and 2. The following proposition states these properties formally.17
Proposition A.1 Impose Assumption 2 as well as Assumption 1. Let µ∗∗ maximize the
expression
UP (µ) =
N∑
i=1
µi − cˆ(µ)− r
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
cˆi(µ)σij cˆj(µ)
over the set Kˆ. Then µ∗∗ ∈ K. Moreover the control path µ∗∗(·) with the constant value
µ∗∗ is a solution to the principal’s problem in the continuous-time model when controls
are restricted to Kˆ. When faced with the incentive scheme s(Zˆ(·), µ∗∗(·)) that is given by
(26) for µ(·) = µ∗∗(·), the agent strictly prefers the control path µ∗∗(·) to any alternative
path that is distinct from it.
Proof of Proposition A.1: We first show that µ∗∗ ∈ K. For this purpose we claim that
there exists a control µˆ ∈ K such that
UP (µˆ) ≥ −r
2
σ2 − cˆ(0). (A.12)
From the definitions of UP (·) and µ∗∗, we have
N∑
i=1
µ∗∗i − cˆ(µ∗∗) > UP (µ∗∗) ≥ UP (µˆ), (A.13)
so (A.12) implies
∑N
i=1 µ
∗∗
i − cˆ(µ∗∗) > − r2σ2 − cˆ(0) and hence µ∗∗ ∈ K.
17The key property is that under Assumption 2, any solution to the principal’s problem necessarily
takes values in the interior of the admissible set Kˆ. In Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993), this is simply assumed,
with some indication of the tension between this assumption and the requirement that the admissible set
be bounded.
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The desired µˆ is obtained as the solution to the problem
max
µ∈Kˆ
[
N∑
i=1
µi − cˆ(µ)
]
. (A.14)
Because 0 ∈ K, we have ∑Ni=1 µˆi − cˆ(µˆ) ≥ −cˆ(0) > − r2σ2 − cˆ(0). Therefore µˆ ∈ K, i.e.,
the solution to the maximization problem (A.14) lies in the interior of Kˆ and satisfies the
first-order conditions cˆi(µˆ) = 1 for i = 1, ..., N. Thus
UP (µˆ) =
N∑
i=1
µˆi − cˆ(µˆ)− r
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
σij ≥ −cˆ(0)− r
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
σij . (A.15)
From (21) and (5), one easily verifies that
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 σij =
∑N
i=0 pˆipi
2
i = σ
2, so (A.12)
follows. As mentioned above, this implies µ∗∗ ∈ K.
Next, we show that the process µ∗∗(·) with the constant value µ∗∗ solves the principal’s
problem in the continuous-time model. Consider any admissible18 control process µ(·)
taking values in Kˆ and incentive scheme s˜ that implements µ(·) relative to Kˆ. By a result
of Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993, Theorem 4.1), there exist adapted processes qi(·), i = 1, ..., N,
taking values in IR such that in terms of the control process µ(·), the implementing
incentive scheme has the representation
s˜ =
∫ 1
0
cˆ(µ(t))dt+
∫ 1
0
N∑
i=1
qi(t) dXi(t) +
r
2
∫ 1
0
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
qi(t)σijqj(t) dt; (A.16)
moreover qi(t) = cˆi(µ(t)) whenever µ(t) belongs to the interior of Kˆ. This yields
E
[∫ 1
0
N∑
i=1
µi(t)dt− s˜
]
= E
∫ 1
0
 N∑
i=1
µi(t)− cˆ(µ(t))− r
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
qi(t)σijqj(t)
 dt (A.17)
for the principal’s expected payoff from implementing the process µ(·). Consider the
integrand on the right-hand side of (A.17). For any t and any event in which µ(t) belongs
to K, by the definition of µ∗∗, we have
N∑
i=1
µi(t) − cˆ(µ(t))− r
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
qi(t)σijqj(t)
=
N∑
i=1
µi(t)− cˆ(µ(t))− r
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
cˆi(µ(t))σij cˆj(µ(t))
= UP (µ(t)) ≤ UP (µ∗∗).
18For a precise definition of of admissibility of a control process, as well as other details of the principal’s
problem in continuous time, we refer the reader to Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993).
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For any t and any event in which µ(t) belongs to IRN\K, by the definition of K in
combination with (A.12 ) and (A.13), we have
N∑
i=1
µi(t) − cˆ(µ(t))− r
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
qi(t)σijqj(t)
≤
N∑
i=1
µi(t)− cˆ(µ(t)) < −r
2
σ2 − cˆ(0) ≤ UP (µ∗∗) .
The integrand on the right-hand side of (A.17) is thus bounded above by UP (µ∗∗) for all
t almost surely. Therefore
UP (µ∗∗) ≥ E
[∫ 1
0
N∑
i=1
µi(t)dt− s˜
]
(A.18)
for any admissible process µ(·) and incentive scheme s˜ that implements µ(·). From (26)
applied to the process µ∗∗(·), one also has
UP (µ∗∗) = E
[∫ 1
0
N∑
i=1
µ∗∗i (t)dt− s˜
]
(A.19)
when s˜ = s(Z(·), µ∗∗(·)) is the scheme that implements µ∗∗(·). Together, (A.19) and (A.18)
show that the control process µ∗∗(·) solves the principal’s problem in the continuous-time
model when controls are restricted to Kˆ.
To conclude the proof of Proposition A.1, we observe that by the results of Scha¨ttler
and Sung (1993, Theorem 4.1 and formula (25), any alternative control process µˆ(·) that
also solves the agent’s problem at the incentive scheme s(·, µ∗∗(·)) that is given by (26)
applied to the process µ(·) = µ∗∗(·) must have the property that for almost all t ∈ [0, 1],
with probability one, the expression
∑N
i=1 µicˆi(µ
∗∗) − cˆ(µ) is maximized at µ = µˆ(t).
Because cˆ(·) is strictly convex, it follows that any such alternative solution to the agent’s
problem must satisfy µˆ(t) = µ∗∗ for almost all t ∈ [0, 1] almost surely, i.e., the process
µˆ(·) must be indistinguishable from µ∗∗(·). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2: Relying on the compactness of Kˆ, let {µ∆′∗} be a convergent sub-
sequence of {µ∆∗}. For any ∆′, let s∆′∗ = (s∆′∗0 , ..., s∆′∗N ) be the incentive scheme imple-
menting µ∆
′∗ in the static model with period length ∆′, and let
s˜∆
′∗ =
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=0
A˜∆
′,τ
i s
∆′∗
i (A.20)
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be the associated cumulative total payment to the agent. By Lemma 2, for any sufficiently
small ∆′, µ∆
′∗ belongs to the interior of Kˆ and so does the limit µ∗. By Theorem 1, as ∆′
goes to zero, the random variables s˜∆
′∗ converge in distribution to
s˜∗ = cˆ(µ∗) +
N∑
i=1
cˆi(µ
∗)Xi(1) +
r
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
cˆi(µ
∗)σij cˆj(µ∗). (A.21)
One easily verifies that the principal’s expected payoffs,
UP∆
′
(µ∆
′∗) =
1
∆′
N∑
i=0
p∆
′
i (µ
∆′∗)[pi∆
′
i − s∆
′∗
i ] =
N∑
i=1
µ∆
′∗
i − Es˜∆
′∗ (A.22)
also converge to
UP (µ∗) =
N∑
i=1
µ∗i − cˆ(µ∗)−
r
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
cˆi(µ
∗)σij cˆj(µ∗). (A.23)
By a result of Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993, Theorem 4.2) and the convexity of cˆ(·), the
incentive scheme s˜∗ actually induces the agent to choose the control path µ∗(·) with the
constant value µ∗, providing the principal with the payoff UP (µ∗). Therefore the principal’s
maximum payoff in the continuous-time model cannot be less than the limit of the payoffs
UP∆
′
(µ∆
′∗) in the discrete-time models.
It remains to be shown that is actually optimal for the principal to implement the
control path µ∗(·) in the continuous-time model. If this is not optimal, we must have
UP (µ∗) < UP (µ∗∗) (A.24)
where µ∗∗ is the optimal constant control that is given by Proposition A.1. For any ∆′,
consider an incentive scheme with cumulative total payments
s˜∆
′∗∗ =
m∑
τ=1
N∑
i=0
A˜∆
′,τ
i s
∆′∗∗
i (A.25)
to the agent where, for i = 0, 1, ..., N,
s∆
′∗∗
i = ∆
′cˆ(µ∗∗)− 1
r
ln
1− rcˆi(µ∗∗)ki∆′ 12 + r N∑
j=1
p∆
′
j (µ
∗∗)cˆj(µ∗∗)kj∆′
1
2
 . (A.26)
The following facts are easily verified:
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• When faced with the incentive scheme (A.25) in the discrete-time model with period
length ∆′, the agent can assure himself an expected payoff equal to −1 simply by
choosing the constant action p∆
′
(µ∗∗). Therefore it is individually rational for him
to accept the principal’s proposing this incentive scheme.
• If in the discrete-time model with period length ∆′, the agent is free to choose
control vectors µτ ∈ Kˆ, inducing actions p∆′(µτ ) ∈ P, for τ = 1, ...,m = 1∆′ , then in
face of the incentive scheme (A.25), an optimal strategy for the agent is to choose a
history-independent constant control µτ = µ
∆′ ∈ Kˆ for all τ, where µ∆′ maximizes
the expected payoff
UA∆
′
(µ) = −
N∑
i=0
p∆
′
i (µ) e
−r(s∆′∗∗i −∆′cˆ(µ)) (A.27)
of the agent in the model with period length ∆′ and incentive payments s∆
′∗∗
i ,
i = 0, 1, ..., N .
• From (A.26), one may rewrite (A.27) as
UA∆
′
(µ) = −e−r∆′[cˆ(µ∗∗)−cˆ(µ)]
(
1− r
N∑
i=0
[p∆
′
i (µ)− p∆
′
i (µ
∗∗)]cˆi(µ∗∗)ki∆′
1
2
)
= −
e−r[cˆ(µ∗∗)−cˆ(µ)] (1− r N∑
i=0
[µi − µ∗∗i ]cˆi(µ∗∗)∆′
) 1
∆′

∆′
. (A.28)
• As ∆′ goes to zero, (−UA∆′(µ)) 1∆′ converges to exp(−r[cˆ(µ∗∗)− cˆ(µ) + r∑Ni=0[µi −
µ∗∗i ]cˆi(µ
∗∗)], uniformly for µ ∈ Kˆ.
• For any ∆′, maximization of UA∆′(µ) over Kˆ is equivalent to minimization of
(−UA∆′(µ)) 1∆′ over the set Kˆ, so by Berge’s maximum theorem, any limit point of
the sequence {µ∆′} is a minimizer of exp(−r[cˆ(µ∗∗)− cˆ(µ) + r∑Ni=0[µi− µ∗∗i ]cˆi(µ∗∗)]
and hence of cˆ(µ)− r∑Ni=0 µicˆi(µ∗∗) over the set Kˆ.
• Because cˆ(·) is strictly convex, µ∗∗ is the unique minimizer of cˆ(µ)− r∑Ni=0 µicˆi(µ∗∗)
over the set Kˆ. Therefore any limit point of the sequence {µ∆′} must be equal to
µ∗∗, and the sequence {µ∆′} itself must be converging to µ∗∗.
• The control vectors µ∆′ belong to the interior of Kˆ whenever ∆′ is sufficiently close
to zero.
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• By Theorem 1, applied to the control processes µ∆′(·) with constant values µ∆′ , as
∆′ goes to zero, the incentive payments s˜∆
′∗∗ that are associated with the imple-
mentation of µ∆
′
converge in distribution to
s˜∗∗ = cˆ(µ∗∗) +
N∑
i=1
cˆi(µ
∗∗)Xi(1) +
r
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
cˆi(µ
∗∗)σij cˆj(µ∗∗), (A.29)
and the principal’s payoff expectations UP∆
′
(µ∆
′
) converge to UP (µ∗∗).
Given the convergence of UP∆
′
(µ∆
′
) to UP (µ∗∗) and of UP∆
′
(µ∆
′∗) to UP (µ∗), the
inequality (A.24) would imply that UP∆
′
(µ∆
′
) > UP∆
′
(µ∆
′∗) for any sufficiently small ∆′.
As this contradicts the optimality of µ∆
′∗ for the principal in the discrete-time problem
with period length ∆′, it follows that the inequality (A.24) must be false, and µ∗(·) must
indeed be optimal for the principal in the continuous-time model. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: To prove that µ(E∗) ∈ K, one uses the same argument as for the
claim in Proposition A.1 that µ∗∗ ∈ K. The maximizer µˆ of E(µ)− cˆ(µ) over Kˆ is also a
minimizer of cˆ(µ) over Kˆ under the constraint E(µ) = E(µˆ) , and we have cˆ(µˆ) = γ(E(µˆ))
and γ′(E(µˆ)) = 1. Then (A.15) implies
E(µˆ)− γ(E(µˆ))− r
2
γ′(E(µˆ))2σ2 ≥ −cˆ(0)− r
2
σ2. (A.30)
By the definition of E∗, it follows that
E∗ − γ(E∗) > E∗ − γ(E∗)− r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2 ≥ −cˆ(0)− r
2
σ2, (A.31)
hence, µ(E∗) ∈ K. By standard arguments, it follows that the first-order conditions for
the agent’s cost minimization problem take the form cˆi(µ(E
∗)) = γ′(E∗) for i = 1, ..., N.
To prove that γ′(E∗) ≥ 0, we note that as γ(·) is convex, γ′(·) is nondecreasing. If γ′(E∗)
were negative, then at E = E∗, γ′(E)2 would be nonincreasing, and E−γ(E)− r
2
γ′(E)2σ2
would be strictly increasing, contrary to the definition of E∗.
To show that the control path µ∗∗(·) with the constant value µ(E∗) solves the princi-
pal’s problem under the given information assumption,we again follow the line of argument
in the proof of Proposition A.1. Consider any admissible control process µ(·) taking values
in Kˆ and any incentive scheme s˜ that implements µ(·) when the principal only observes
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the aggregate process z(·) = ∑Ni=1 Zi(·). By Theorem 4.1 of Scha¨ttler and Sung, there exist
adapted processes qi(·), i = 1, ..., N, taking values in IR such that the incentive scheme s˜
has the representation
s˜ =
∫ 1
0
cˆ(µ(t))dt+
∫ 1
0
N∑
i=1
qi(t)dZi(t)−
∫ 1
0
N∑
i=1
qi(t)µi(t)dt (A.32)
+
r
2
∫ 1
0
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
qi(t)σijqj(t)dt.
If the principal observes only the process z(·) = ∑Ni=1 Zi(·), the processes qi(·) must
satisfy q1(t) = ... = qN(t) almost surely, for all t. By Theorem 4.1 of Scha¨ttler and Sung,
it must also be the case that for any t, with probability one,
∑N
i=1 qi(t)µi − cˆ(µ) reaches
a maximum over Kˆ at µ = µ(t); with q1(t) = ... = qN(t), this implies that for any t, with
probability one, under the constraint E(µ) = E(µ(t)), cˆ(µ) reaches a minimum over Kˆ at
µ = µ(t). This in turn yields cˆ(µ(t)) = γ(E(µ(t))) and, by a standard envelope argument,
q1(t) = ... = qN(t) = γ
′(E(µ(t))). Then (A.32) can be rewritten as:
s˜ =
∫ 1
0
γ(E(µ(t)))dt+
∫ 1
0
γ′(E(µ(t)))
N∑
i=1
dZi(t)−
∫ 1
0
γ′(E(µ(t)))E(µ(t))dt
+
r
2
∫ 1
0
γ′(E(µ(t)))2σ2dt. (A.33)
Conditional on the process E(µ(·)), the principal’s net expected payoff from implementing
the control process µ(·) through the incentive scheme s˜ is then almost surely equal to∫ 1
0
E(µ(t))dt−
∫ 1
0
γ(E(µ(t)))dt− r
2
∫ 1
0
γ′(E(µ(t)))2σ2dt. (A.34)
By the definition of E∗, this is no larger than E∗ − γ(E∗) − r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2, the principal’s
net expected payoff from implementing the control process µ∗∗(·) with constant value
µ∗∗(t) = µ(E∗). This confirms that under the given information assumption it is optimal
for the principal to implement the process µ∗∗(·). The representation (40) of the incentive
scheme that implements µ∗∗(·) is obtained by substituting for E(µ(t)) = E∗ in (A.33) and
using the fact that
∫ 1
0
∑N
i=1 dZi(t) =
∑N
i=1[Zi(1)− Zi(0)] =
∑N
i=1 Zi(1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Given the incentive scheme S∆(·, ·), let (w(·), zˆ(·)) be the optimal
reporting strategy of the agent, and define
s∆(·) = S∆(w(·), zˆ(·)) . (A.35)
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If the true value of cumulative total profits is z, he prefers to choose the pair (w(z), zˆ(z))
as opposed to destroying profits unnoticed down to z′ < z and reporting (w(z′), zˆ(z′)).
Therefore it must be the case that S∆(w(z), zˆ(z)) ≥ S∆(w(z′), zˆ(z′)), whenever z > z′, so
s∆(·) is nondecreasing. Given that s∆(·) is nondecreasing, an optimal reporting strategy
zˆ∗(·) for the agent when faced with s∆(·) is to tell the truth, i.e., set zˆ∗(z) ≡ z.
To show that under the given information assumptions the incentive scheme s∆(·)
implements the control path µ∆(·), we note that since S∆(·, ·) implements µ∆(·), with
reports given by (w(·), zˆ(·)), we have
EUA(S∆(w(·), zˆ(·)), µ∆(·)) ≥ EUA(S∆(w¯(·), z¯(·)), µˆ∆(·)) (A.36)
for any alternative reporting strategy (w¯(·), z¯(·)) that is feasible and any alternative con-
trol process µˆ∆(·) where EUA(S∆(w¯(·), z¯(·)), µˆ∆(·)) denotes the agent’s expected payoff
from choosing the control process µˆ∆(·) and reporting strategy (w¯(·), z¯(·)) when the in-
centive scheme is S∆(·, ·). In particular,
EUA(S∆(w(·), zˆ(·)), µ∆(·)) ≥ EUA(S∆(w(·), zˆ(·)), µˆ∆(·)) (A.37)
and hence
EUA(s∆(zˆ∗(·)), µ∆(·)) ≥ EUA(s∆(zˆ∗(·)), µˆ∆(·)) (A.38)
for any alternative control path µˆ∆(·), where zˆ∗(·) is again the truthtelling strategy. Since
s∆(·) is nondecreasing, it follows that
EUA(s∆(zˆ∗(·)), µ∆(·)) ≥ EUA(s∆(z¯(·)), µˆ∆(·)) (A.39)
for any alternative control path µˆ∆(·) and reporting strategy z¯(·) under the incentive
scheme s∆(·).
Finally, since s∆(·) implements the same time path of actions and yields the same
payments to the agent, his expected utility is the same under s∆(·) with the truthtelling
strategy zˆ∗(·) as under S∆(·, ·) with the optimal reporting strategy (w(·), zˆ(·)). As for
the principal, he benefits when there is no destruction of profits, so on top of the payoff
that he would get under S∆(·, ·) with the reporting strategy (w(·), zˆ(·)) he obtains the
(expected value of) the difference z− zˆ(z), which is destroyed under the reporting strategy
(w(·), zˆ(·)). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Proposition 3 is essentially a version of Helly’s selection theorem,
see, e.g. Billingsley (1968, p. 227). To apply Helly’s argument, we need to show that for
any z ∈ IR, there exists a compact interval [s(z), s¯(z)] ⊂ IR such that s∆(z) ∈ [s(z), s¯(z)]
for any sufficiently small ∆.
For any ∆, the fact that the incentive scheme s∆(·) serves to implement the control
process µ∆(·) implies that the participation constraint
−E exp{−r[s∆(z∆)−
∫ 1
0
cˆ(µ∆(t))dt]} ≥ −1 (A.40)
is satisfied, where z∆ :=
∑N
i=1 Z
∆
i (1) =
∑N
i=1[M
∆
i (1) + X
∆
i (1)]. Given that µ
∆(t) ∈ Kˆ
with probability one for all t, we have E + x∆ ≤ z∆ ≤ E¯ + x∆, where, as before, E and
E¯ are the minimum and the maximum of
∑N
i=1 µi on Kˆ, and x
∆ :=
∑N
i=1X
∆
i (1). By the
monotonicity of s∆(·), (A.40) implies
−E exp{−rs∆(E¯ + x∆)} ≥ − exp{−rc}, (A.41)
where c is the minimum of cˆ(µ) on Kˆ. By the monotonicity of s∆(·), it follows that, for
any fixed z ∈ IR,
− exp{−rs∆(z)}prob{x∆ ≤ z − E¯} ≥ − exp{−rc
¯
}. (A.42)
Proposition B.1 in Appendix B implies that, as ∆ goes to zero, prob{x∆ ≤ z − E¯}
converges to Φ(z − E¯), where Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution function with
mean zero and variance σ2. If we fix some ε ∈ (0,Φ(z − E¯)) and set
s(z) := rc
¯
+ ln(Φ(z − E¯)− ε), (A.43)
we may conclude that s∆(z) ≥s
¯
(z) for any sufficiently small ∆.
To obtain a uniform upper bound s¯(z) for s∆(z), we note that, by assumption, there
exists a bound S¯ such that Es∆(z∆) ≤ S¯ and, hence,
E[s∆(z∆)| z∆ ≤ z] prob{z∆ ≤ z}+ s∆(z)(1− prob{z∆ ≤ z}) ≤ S¯. (A.44)
for all ∆. From (A.40), we also have
−E[exp{−rs∆(z∆)}| z∆ ≤ z] prob{z∆ ≤ z} ≥ − exp{−rc
¯
},
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hence, since the agent is risk averse,
E[s∆(z∆)| z∆ ≤ z] ≥ rc
¯
+ ln prob{z∆ ≤ z}.
Thus (A.44) implies
s∆(z)(1− prob{z∆ ≤ z}) ≤ S¯ − [rc
¯
+ ln prob{z∆ ≤ z}] prob{z∆ ≤ z} (A.45)
and hence
s∆(z) ≤ max{S¯, 0, −[rc
¯
+ ln prob{z∆ ≤ z}]}
≤ max{S¯, 0, −[rc
¯
+ ln prob{x∆ ≤ z − E
¯
}]}. (A.46)
By Proposition B.1 in Appendix B, prob{x∆ ≤ z−E
¯
} converges to Φ(z−E
¯
) as ∆ converges
to zero. If for some ε > 0, we set
s¯(z) = max{S¯, 0, −[rc
¯
+ ln prob{x∆ ≤ z − E
¯
}]}+ ε,
we may conclude that s∆(z) ≤ s¯(z) for any sufficiently small ∆.
Now for any z ∈ IR, the fact that s∆(z) ∈ [s(z), s¯(z)] for any sufficiently small
∆ implies that the sequence {s∆(z)} has a convergent subsequence. More generally if
{z1, z2, ...} be a countable and dense subset of IR, then, by a standard diagonalization
argument, there exists a subsequence of incentive schemes, {s∆′(·)}, such that for any i,
the sequence {s∆′(zi)} converges to a limit s(zi). This defines a nondecreasing function
s(·) on the set {z1, z2, ...}. Given that the set {z1, z2, ...} is dense in IR, an extension of
s(·) to IR is defined by setting
s(z) = lim
zi↓z
s(zi) (A.47)
where the limit is taken with respect to any sequence in {z1, z2, ...} that converges to z
from above. Since s(·) is nondecreasing on {z1, z2, ...}, for any z ∈ IR, the limit in (A.47) is
well defined. Moreover, from (A.47), one easily sees that s(·) is everywhere nondecreasing
and right-continuous, hence upper semi-continuous. From the mononicity of the incentive
schemes s∆
′
(·), one also finds that for any ε > 0 and any z,
s(z − ε) ≤ lim inf s∆′(z) ≤ lim sup s∆′(z) ≤ s(z).
Hence lim∆′→0 s∆
′
(z) = s(z) for any z ∈ IR at which s(·) is continuous. Q.E.D.
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Sketch of the Proof of Proposition 4:19 As discussed in the text, for any control processes
µ∆(·), µ(·) in the discrete-time models and the continuous-time model, the associated
cumulative control processes can be thought of as random variables that take values in
the space CN of continuous-functions from the time interval [0, 1] into IRN . If controls
are restricted to the subset Kˆ of IRN , the realizations of the cumulative control processes
M∆(·) and M(·) must actually belong to the subspace CN
Kˆ
of functions F on [0, 1] that
have a representation
F (t) =
∫ t
0
fF (t
′)dt′ (A.48)
for some function fF (·) from [0, 1] into Kˆ. For any such function F, we can define
Γ(F ) =
∫ 1
0
cˆ(fF (t))dt (A.49)
as the associated cumulative total effort cost. Given that the set Kˆ is compact, the
functions in CN
Kˆ
are uniformly bounded and equicontinuous, and the function space CN
Kˆ
is
precompact. Indeed, because Kˆ is convex and the effort cost function cˆ(·) is convex, one
can show that CN
Kˆ
is actually compact and the cost function Γ : CN
Kˆ
→ IR that is defined
by (A.49) is lower semi-continuous.
Let {(M∆′(·), X∆′(·))} be the sequence of cumulative-control and cumulative-devia-
tions processes that corresponds to the convergent subsequence of incentive schemes.
Compactness of the space CN
Kˆ
is used to show that any subsequence {(M∆′′(·), X∆′′(·))}
of the sequence {(M∆′(·), X∆′(·))} has a further subsequence which converges in distri-
bution to a pair (M(·), X(·)) such that X(·) is the driftless Brownian motion specified in
Theorem 1. The distributions Φ∆
′′
of the joint processes (M∆
′′
(·), X∆′′(·)) are supported
by the product CN
Kˆ
× CN . By Proposition B.1 in Appendix B, the sequence of marginal
distributions of the cumulative-deviations processes X∆
′′
(·) converges to the distribution
of the process X(·), so by Prohorov’s Theorem (Billingsley, 1968, p. 240), this sequence is
tight. Given that CN
Kˆ
is compact, this implies that the sequence {Φ∆′′} itself is tight. By
Prohorov’s Theorem again, it follows that the sequence {Φ∆′′} has a subsequence which
converges to a distribution Φ∞ on CN
Kˆ
× CN . The marginal distribution on CN that is
induced by Φ∞ must obviously coincide with the distribution of the process X(·).
19The full proof is available upon request or can be downloaded directly from
http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls schmidt/research/disc/disc.htm.
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The limit process (M(·), X(·)) has the additional property that for any t, the history
of the process (M(·), X(·)) up to t and the continuation of the process X(·) from t on
are conditionally independent given X(t), i.e., the cumulative-control process M(·) does
not require the agent ever to rely on information about the continuation of the process
X(·) that he cannot be presumed to have. One easily verifies that for any t ∈ (0, 1), the
argument in the proof of Proposition B.1 in Appendix B remains valid if the distributions
of the processes X∆(·) = (X∆1 (·), ..., X∆N (·)) are replaced by the (regular) conditional
distributions of the continuations {X∆(t′)}t′∈(t.1] = {(X∆1 (t′), ..., X∆N (·))}t′∈(t.1] given the
histories of the joint processes {(M∆(·), X∆(·))} up to time ∆[t/∆].20 By an argument
given in Hellwig (1996), this convergence property of conditional distributions is sufficient
for the desired conditional-independence property in the limit.
Given that any subsequence {(M∆′′(·), X∆′′(·))} of the sequence {(M∆′(·), X∆′(·))}
has a subsequence which converges in distribution, convergence of the sequence
{
(M∆
′
(·),
X∆
′
(·))
}
itself is assured if all convergent subsequences have the same limit. For this it
suffices to show that the control process µ(·) which corresponds to the cumulative control
process M(·) is actually an optimal control process for the agent in the continuous-time
model with incentive scheme s(·). This is so because, with a strictly convex cost function,
by the results of Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2), regardless of the
incentive scheme, the solution to the agent’s problem in the continuous-time model is
unique in the sense that any two optimal control processes must have the same values
almost surely for almost all t ∈ [0, 1].
In an abuse of notation, we write {(M∆′(·), X∆′(·))} for whichever convergent subse-
quence is to be considered, and we show that if {(M∆′(·), X∆′(·))} converges in distribu-
tion to a pair (M(·), X(·)), then the limiting cumulative control processM(·) must almost
surely coincide with the process M∗(·) which is optimal for the agent in the continuous-
time model with incentive scheme s(·). The argument proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: The agent’s expected payoff from the limit pair (M(·), X(·)) in the continuous-
time model with incentive scheme s(·) is not significantly worse than his expected payoffs
20These regular conditional distributions themselves can be regarded as measure-valued random vari-
ables, i.e., functions from the appropriate spaces of histories into spaces of measures on continuations.
In the absence of a common underlying probability space, convergence in distribution of these measure-
valued random variables then is the appropriate convergence concept; for details see Hellwig (1996).
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from the pairs {(M∆′(·), X∆′(·))} in the discrete-time models with incentive schemes s∆′
when ∆′ is small. Formally,
lim
∆¯→∞
sup
∆′≤∆¯
[−E exp{−r[s∆′(z∆′)− Γ(M∆′(·))]}]
≤ −E exp{−r[s
(
N∑
i=1
(Mi(1) +Xi(1))
)
− Γ(M(·))]}, (A.50)
where, as before, z∆
′
=
∑N
i=1 Z
∆′
i (1) =
∑N
i=1[M
∆′
i (1) +X
∆′
i (1)].
Step 2: The agent’s payoff from the limit pair (M(·), X(·)) in the continuous-time
model with incentive scheme s(·) is no better than his maximal payoff in the continuous-
time model with this incentive scheme. Formally,
−E exp{−r[s
(
N∑
i=1
(Mi(1) +Xi(1))
)
− Γ(M(·))]}
≤ −E exp{−r[s
(
N∑
i=1
(M∗i (1) +Xi(1))
)
− Γ(M∗(·))]}, (A.51)
where M∗(·) is the optimal cumulative control process in the continuous-time model with
incentive scheme s(·).
Step 3: The agent’s maximal payoff in the continuous-time model with the incentive
scheme s(·) is not significantly better than his maximal payoffs in the discrete-time models
with incentive schemes s∆
′
(·) when ∆′ is small. Formally,
−E exp{−r[s
(
N∑
i=1
(M∗i (1) +Xi(1))
)
− Γ(M∗(·))]}
≤ lim
∆¯→∞
inf
∆′≤∆¯
[−E exp{−r[s∆′(z∆′)− Γ(M∆′(·))]}]. (A.52)
Given that
lim
∆¯→∞
inf
∆′≤∆¯
[−E exp{−r[s∆′(z∆′)− Γ(M∆′(·))]}]
≤ lim
∆¯→∞
sup
∆′≤∆¯
[−E exp{−r[s∆′(z∆′)− Γ(M∆′(·))]}],
the three inequalities (A.50) - (A.52) imply that
−E exp{−r[s
(
N∑
i=1
(Mi(1) +Xi(1))
)
− Γ(M(·))]}
= −E exp{−r[s
(
N∑
i=1
(M∗i (1) +Xi(1))
)
− Γ(M∗(·))]}, (A.53)
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i.e., that the limit pair (M(·), X(·)) provides the agent with the maximal payoff that he
can obtain in the continuous-time model with incentive scheme s(·). By the results of
Scha¨ttler and Sung mentioned above (1993, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2), this in turn implies
that M(·) = M∗(·) almost surely. The three inequalities (A.50) - (A.52) are therefore
sufficient to establish Proposition 4.
Turning to the arguments required to prove these inequalities themselves, the proof of
(A.50) is routine. Given the convergence in distribution of the sequence {(M∆′(·), X∆′(·))},
one uses (41), the upper semi-continuity of s(·) and the lower semi-continuity of Γ(·) as
well as Skorokhod’s theorem, the change-of-variables formula, and Fatou’s lemma (Hilden-
brand (1974), pp. 50 and 46). The proof of (A.51) involves a version of Kuhn’s theo-
rem to the effect that, with the independence property specified above, the limit pair
(M(·), X(·)) is payoff-equivalent to a mixed strategy in the sense of a prior randomization
of pure strategies of the agent, where a pure strategy is defined as a (suitably adapted)
function from the space CN of realizations of the process of cumulative deviations from
the mean to the space CN
Kˆ
of realizations of the cumulative control process. Any pure
strategy in the support of the mixed strategy corresponding to (M(·), X(·)), is dominated
by the agent’s optimal pure strategy in the continuous-time model with incentive scheme
s(·). This implies that the mixed strategy itself - and with it the pair (M(·), X(·)) - is so
dominated, which is just (A.51).
The proof of (A.52) starts from the optimal control process µ∗(·) at the incentive
scheme s(·) in the continuous-time model. The idea is to construct approximations of this
process for the different discrete-time models so that for small period lengths expected
payoffs from these approximations are not significantly worse than expected payoffs from
choosing the process µ∗(·) in the continuous-time model with incentive scheme s(·). Triv-
ially, this implies that for small period lengths expected payoffs from optimal control
processses in the discrete-time models are also not significantly worse than the agent’s
payoff from choosing the process µ∗(·) in the continuous-time model with incentive scheme
s(·). Construction of the desired approximations is routine except for the need to take
account of possible discontinuities in the (pure) strategy that generates the process µ∗(·)
in the continuous-time model and in the incentive scheme s(·). Relying on Lusin’s theo-
rem one avoids the former by first approximating the process µ∗(·) in the continuous-time
48
model by some other process µ∗η(·) generated by a continuous strategy. To avoid the
latter one has the agent add just a little ε > 0 of effort so that the approximations we are
considering lead him “to the right” of whatever discontinuity point the limiting incentive
scheme may have.
Once the construction of approximating control processes is set up, the remainder of
the argument is routine, along the same lines as in the proof of (A.50). However, where
the proof of (A.50) can do with Fatou’s lemma, the corresponding argument here needs
Lebesgue’s convergence theorem, hence uniform integrability of the agent’s payoffs under
the approximating control processes. Specifically, it must not be the case that under the
approximating control processes the incentive schemes s∆
′
(·) involve ever larger penalties
with ever smaller probabilities affecting expected payoffs along the sequence, but not in
the limit. Under the assumption that the original control processes µ∆
′
(·) take values in
the interior of the feasible set, this uniform-integrability condition is satisfied because the
first-order conditions for interior control choices of the agent relate payments to (marginal)
costs, and these are uniformly bounded on the compact set Kˆ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3: We first consider the implications of the incentive schemes s∆∗∗(·, η),
η > 0, in the discrete-time model with period length ∆. Suppose first that controls can
be chosen from the boundary as well as the interior of Kˆ. Then one easily verifies that,
when faced with this scheme, the agent is willing to choose a control path µ∆∗∗(·) with
a constant value µ∆∗∗, which is independent of η. Moreover, as ∆ goes to zero, µ∆∗∗
converges to µ(E∗) as specified in Proposition 1. Since µ(E∗) belongs to the interior of
Kˆ, for any sufficiently small ∆, µ∆∗∗ also belongs to the interior of Kˆ, and the process
µ∆∗∗(·) is optimal for the agent even if boundary controls are ruled out. By Theorem 1,
the certainty equivalents of the agent’s payoffs converge to η > 0, so for any sufficiently
small ∆, the participation constraint is also satisfied. This shows that for any η > 0 and
any sufficiently small ∆, by offering the incentive scheme s∆∗∗(·, η), the principal obtains
the expected payoff
N∑
i=1
µ∆∗∗i − γ(E∗)− γ′(E∗)(E(µ∆∗∗)− E∗)−
r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2 − η.
As ∆ goes to zero, this converges to E∗−γ(E∗)− r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2−η, so for any η > 0 and any
sufficiently small ∆, by offering the incentive scheme s∆∗∗(·, η), the principal can assure
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himself an expected payoff which is no less than E∗ − γ(E∗)− r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2 − 2η.
Now suppose that the theorem is false. Then there exist ε > 0 and a sequence {∆′} of
period lengths such that for every ∆′, there exists an incentive scheme s∆
′
(·) implementing
a control process µ∆
′
(·) with values in the interior of Kˆ so that the principal obtains an
expected payoff equal to at least E∗− γ(E∗)− r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2+ ε
2
. Given this uniform bound
on the principal’s expected payoffs, expected incentive payments satisfy
Es∆
′
(z∆
′
) ≤ E¯ − [E∗ − γ(E∗)− r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2 +
ε
2
] (A.54)
and are thus uniformly bounded. By Proposition 3, it follows that there exists a non-
decreasing, upper semi-continuous function s(·) such that some subsequence of the se-
quence {s∆′(·)}, converges to s(·) in the sense of (41) and (42). By Proposition 4, it
follows that the pairs (M∆
′
(·), X∆′(·)) of cumulative control and deviations processes
associated with the processes µ∆
′
(·) converge in distribution to a pair (M(·), X(·)) of cu-
mulative control and deviations processes associated with the optimal control process µ(·)
in the continuous-time model with incentive scheme s(·). Moreover the expected incen-
tive payments Es∆
′
(
∑N
i=1[M
∆′
i (1) +X
∆′
i (1)]) converge to the expected incentive payment
Es(
∑N
i=1[Mi(1) +Xi(1)]) in the continuous-time model. Then we must have
lim
∆′→0
E
[
N∑
i=1
M∆
′
i (1)− s∆
′
(
N∑
i=1
[M∆
′
i (1) +X
∆′
i (1)])
]
= E
[
N∑
i=1
Mi(1)− s(
N∑
i=1
[Mi(1) +Xi(1)])
]
(A.55)
However, by the definition of E∗ and the optimality of µ(·) in the continuous-time model
with incentive scheme s(·), we also have
E
[
N∑
i=1
Mi(1)− s(
N∑
i=1
[Mi(1) +Xi(1)])
]
≤ E∗ − γ(E∗)− r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2. (A.56)
From (A.55) and (A.56) together, one concludes that for any sufficiently small ∆′
E
[
N∑
i=1
M∆
′
i (1)− s∆
′
(
N∑
i=1
[M∆
′
i (1) +X
∆′
i (1)])
]
≤ E∗ − γ(E∗)− r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2 +
ε
4
. (A.57)
This contradicts the assumption that the principal’s expected payoffs from using the
incentive schemes s∆
′
(·) in the discrete-time models are bounded below by E∗ − γ(E∗)−
r
2
γ′(E∗)2σ2+ ε
2
. The assumption that the theorem is false has thus led to a contradiction,
which proves the theorem. Q.E.D.
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Appendix B
In this appendix we discuss the relationship between discrete-time and continuous-time
strategies and outcome processes when the agent’s choice at any one time may depend on
the history of the process up to this time. In them-period discrete-time model with period
length ∆ = 1
m
, the agent chooses a sequence {µ˜∆,τ}mτ=1 of possibly history-dependent
controls. This choice generates a sequence {p˜i∆,τ}mτ=1 of random profit levels. We assume
that for each τ , the agent’s control choice µ˜∆,τ is given by a - possibly degenerate - function
of profit realizations prior to τ , i.e., that we can write
µ˜∆,τ = µˆ∆,τ (p˜i∆,1, ..., p˜i∆,τ−1) (B.1)
for all τ , and we identify the agent’s strategy with the sequence of functions {µˆ∆,τ}mτ=1.
The range of each function µˆ∆,τ is taken to be the compact set Kˆ ⊂ IRN . Given the
control strategy {µˆ∆,τ}mτ=1 the profit sequence {p˜i∆,τ}mτ=1 is assumed to satisfy the con-
dition that for each τ ∈ {1, ...,m}, p˜i∆,τ takes values in {pi0∆ 12 , ..., piN∆ 12} and, for given
pi∆,1, ..., pi∆,τ−1
Prob({p˜i∆,τ = pii∆ 12} | p˜i∆,1 = pi∆,1, ..., p˜i∆,τ−1 = pi∆,τ−1) (B.2)
= p∆i (µˆ
∆,τ (pi∆,1, ..., pi∆,τ−1))
As in the text, a given control strategy {µˆ∆,τ}mτ=1 and associated profit sequence {p˜i∆,τ}mτ=1
are used to define counting variables A˜∆,τi , i = 0, 1, ..., N, τ = 1, ...,m,m =
1
∆
= 1, 2, ...
such that A˜∆,τi = 1 ⇔ p˜i∆,τ = pii∆
1
2 and A˜∆,τi = 0 ⇔ p˜i∆,τ 6= pii∆
1
2 . From (B.2) one
obviously has:
E[A˜∆,τi |p˜i∆,1 = pi∆,1, ..., p˜i∆,τ−1 = pi∆,τ−1] ≡ p∆i (µˆ∆,τ (pi∆,1, ..., pi∆,τ−1)) (B.3)
It follows that if we write
X˜∆i (τ) = ki∆
1
2 (A˜∆,τi − p∆i (µˆ∆,τ (pi∆,1, ..., pi∆,τ−1)) (B.4)
for the cumulative deviations of realized from expected profits in dimension i, we have
E[X˜∆i (τ)|p˜i∆,1 = pi∆,1, ..., p˜i∆,τ−1 = pi∆,τ−1] ≡ 0 (B.5)
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i.e., for any ∆ the process {(X˜∆1 (τ), ..., X˜∆N (τ))}mτ=1 of cumulative deviations from the
means is a martingale. Again using a linear interpolation to obtain a continuous-time
representation of this process, we write for any i and any t ∈ [0, 1]:
X∆i (t) =
(
1− t
∆
+
[
t
∆
])
X˜∆i
([
t
∆
])
+
(
t
∆
−
[
t
∆
])
X˜∆i
([
t
∆
]
+ 1
)
(B.6)
where again [ t
∆
] denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to t
∆
. For any ∆,
(X∆1 (·), ..., X∆N (·)) is a random function taking values in the space CN of continuous func-
tions from [0, 1] into IRN . The distribution of (X∆1 (·), ..., X∆N (·)) depends on the chosen
control strategy of the agent. Taking CN to be endowed with the topology of uniform
convergence, we obtain:
Proposition B.1 For m = 1, 2, . . . , and ∆ = 1
m
, let {µˆ∆,τ}mτ=1 be a control
strategy taking values in the compact set Kˆ, and consider the induced process
(X∆1 (·), ..., X∆N (·)) of cumulative deviations from the means. As m goes out
of bounds and ∆ converges to zero, the processes (X∆1 (·), ..., X∆N (·)) converge
in distribution to the Gaussian process X(·) with initial value X(0) = 0, zero
drift, and covariance matrix Σ given by (21) .
Proof: For any ∆, let {p˜i∆,τ}mτ=1 be the random profit sequence that is induced by the
control strategy {µˆ∆,τ}mτ=1. For any ∆ and any t ∈ [0, 1], let F∆t be the σ-algebra on the
underlying probability space that is generated by the random variables p˜i∆,1, ..., p˜i∆,[t/∆].
Fix some vector q ∈ IRN , and consider the stochastic process X∆q (·) on [0, 1] such that
for any t ∈ [0, 1],
X∆q (t) =
N∑
i=1
qiX
∆
i (t) (B.7)
For any t and ∆, (B.5) and (B.6) yield:
E[X∆q ([t/∆]∆ +∆)−X∆q ([t/∆]∆)|F∆t ] = E[
N∑
i=1
qiX˜
∆,[t/∆]+∆
i |F∆t ] = 0 (B.8)
For any two vectors q1, q2 ∈ IRN , one also has:
E[(X∆q1([t/∆]∆ +∆) − X∆q1([t/∆]∆)(X∆q2([t/∆]∆ +∆)−X∆q2([t/∆]∆)|F∆t ]
= E[
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
q1i X˜
∆,[t/∆]+∆
i q
2
j X˜
∆,[t/∆]+∆
j |F∆t ]
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= E[
N∑
i=1
q1i q
2
i k
2
i ∆ (1− p∆i (µ˜∆,[t/∆])) p∆i (µ˜∆,[t/∆])|F∆t ]
−E[
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
q1i q
2
j kikj ∆ p
∆
i (µ˜
∆,[t/∆]) p∆j (µ˜
∆,[t/∆])|F∆t ]
=
N∑
i=1
q1i q
2
i k
2
i ∆ pˆi −
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
q1i q
2
j kikj ∆ pˆi pˆj +∆O(∆)
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
q1i q
2
j σij ∆ +∆O(∆) (B.9)
where σij is the ij-th element of the matrix Σ (see (21) in the text) and O(∆) is a term
that goes to zero when ∆ goes to zero, uniformly in strategies and histories.
Now consider the vector process
X∆Q = (X
∆
q1 , ..., X
∆
qN ) (B.10)
where q1, ..., qN are eigenvectors of the matrix Σ, normed so that qr ′qr = λ−1r where λr
is the eigenvalue of Σ that corresponds to qr. Given that Σ is a symmetric, positive
definite matrix, the eigenvectors qr, qs, r 6= s, are mutually orthogonal. For this choice of
q1, ..., qN , (B.9) yields:
E[(X∆qr([t/∆]∆ +∆) − X∆qr([t/∆]∆)(X∆qs([t/∆]∆ +∆)−X∆qs([t/∆]∆)|F∆t ]
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
qri q
s
j σij ∆ +∆O(∆)
=
N∑
i=1
qri λsq
s
i ∆+∆O(∆)
= δrs ∆+∆O(∆) (B.11)
where δij = 1 if i = j and δij = 0 if i 6= j.
Finally we also have, for any ε > 0, any t and any i,
Prob{|X∆qi ([t/∆]∆ +∆)−X∆qi ([t/∆]∆| ≥ ε|F∆t } = 0 (B.12)
for any ∆ < [ε/max |kj|]2.
From (B.8), (B.11), and (B.12), one easily sees that the processes X∆Q ,∆ = 1,
1
2
, 1
2
, ...
satisfy the assumptions of Theorems 6 and 7 of Gihman and Skorohod (1979, p.195). It fol-
lows that for any t, as ∆ converges to zero, the conditional distributions of {X∆Q (t′)}t′∈[t,1]
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given F∆t converge to the conditional distribution of a standard N -dimensional Brownian
motion B(·) on [t, 1] given the “initial” value B(t). In particular the overall distributions
of the processes X∆Q on [0, 1] converge to the distribution of a standard Brownian motion
on [0, 1] with ininital value B(0) = 0.
Given this convergence result, the proposition follows from Theorem 5.1 of Billingsley
(1968, p.30) in conjunction with the observation that for any ∆, one has (X∆1 (·), ..., X∆N (·)) =
(Q′)−1X∆Q . Q.E.D.
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